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Abstract 
This paper analyses how a case were to unfold if an 
operator of a nuclear installation were to exercise its right of 
recourse against a supplier in the event of supply of equipment or 
material with latent defects, as envisaged under the unique Section 
17(b) of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLND 
Act), adopted by the Indian Parliament.  This study is relevant as no 
such right of recourse claim has ever been exercised yet by a 
nuclear installation operator against a supplier, in the absence of 
any contractual agreement—and yet, this is precisely what this new 
law in India foresees as a perfectly valid legal option.  The 
uniqueness of this provision and many grey areas surrounding this 
law have had a dampening effect on the global supplier market for 
nuclear power plants in India, other than for the indigenously 
designed Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors.  This is why it is worth 
dissecting how such a case were to unfold, should the Indian 
nuclear power operator nevertheless decide to rely on this right of 
recourse provision.  Unlike the relationship between claims filed by 
victims against the nuclear operator, the right of recourse claim by 
the operator against the supplier would be governed by standard 
tort law.  We, therefore, evaluate general tort law principles as well 
as case law derived from comparable sectors, such as the oil and 
aviation industries, where any major accident is perceived as a low-
probability event, but with high impact on the society.  In doing so, 
we will also scrutinise the meaning of “latent defects” as defined 
contractually, with the supplier’s obligation to remedy the defect, 
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versus the monetary damage claim from the operator against the 
supplier based on a latent defect after the occurrence of a nuclear 
incident.  Hence, this paper is intended as a guide for all 
practitioners in the nuclear energy field, but it could also be of 
interest to experts in comparable sectors, or even large 
infrastructure projects. 
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I. INTRODUCTION—NUCLEAR LAW AS A SPECIFIC SUBJECT 
LAW DEVIATING FROM GENERAL TORT LAW 
Before we delve into the key question underpinning this 
study and examine how a case were to unfold before a court, if an 
operator of nuclear installation in India were to exercise its right of 
recourse against a supplier in the event of supply of equipment or 
material with latent defects, as envisaged under the Civil Liability 
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for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLND Act),1 it is worth reiterating 
some of the basic principles driving the specific civil liability 
regimes for nuclear damage internationally and how these have been 
applied specifically in India.2 
Given the complexity of any litigation which might ensue 
after any major nuclear incident, potentially with transboundary 
dimensions, most countries have agreed from a policy perspective 
that general tort law may not be entirely well suited to the nuclear 
energy sector.  This is mainly because a nuclear incident is 
inherently earmarked as a high-impact, low-probability event.  This 
is true for other sectors such as the oil and aviation sector as well, 
where any major accident (with its low probability) will admittedly 
have a high impact on society.3  From a public policy perspective, 
governments have felt that it would impose an unjustified burden on 
the public and its victims to file civil liability claims based on tort 
law principles, with the requirement to establish negligence of the 
defendant(s) and ensuing lengthy litigation.  This gave rise to one of 
the key nuclear liability principles: legal channelling of liability to 
 
 1 The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, No. 38 of 2010, INDIA CODE (2010),  
https://indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2084?sam_handle=123456789/1362 (India) 
[https://perma.cc/K59B-N8MX] [hereinafter CLND Act]. The Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage Rules, 2011, Gazette of India (Nov. 11, 2011), 
http://prsindia.org/uploads/media/Nuclear%20Rules/Civil%20Liability%20for%20Nuclear
%20Damage%20Rules%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5A2-KW2U] [hereinafter CLND 
Rules]. 
 2 Much has already been written about the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 
2010, the CLND Rules of 2011 and its possible interpretation, including, inter alia: See 
generally Robert J. Gruendel & Els Reynaers Kini, Through the Looking Glass: Placing 
India’s New Civil Liability Regime for Nuclear Damage in Context, 89 NUCLEAR LAW 
BULLETIN 45 (2012) [hereinafter Through the Looking Glass]; Mohit Abraham, NUCLEAR 
LIABILITY: A KEY COMPONENT OF THE PUBLIC POLICY DECISION TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR 
ENERGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (American Academy of Arts and Sciences et al. eds., 2014); 
ELS REYNAERS KINI, INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRADE––INCHING FORWARD?, KEY DEVELOPMENTS 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, CANADA LAW BOOK 101129 (Stanley Berger et al. eds, 2014); 
ELS REYNAERS KINI, NEWS FROM THE FRONT LINES OF NUCLEAR LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
REGIONAL CONFERENCE 315330, (2015); M P Ram Mohan, Which Interpretational Route 
Will the Supreme Court of India Follow When Faced with the Contentious Civil Liability 
for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010?, 40 STATUTE L. REV. 249, 24965 (2018), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmy007 [https://perma.cc/AF85-P9WM]; M P Ram 
Mohan, Nuclear Liability Law in India. An Appraisal of Extent of Liability, Right of 
Recourse and Transboundary Application, 17 J. RISK RES. 1 (2013). 
 3 Bernice Lee, Felix Preston & Gemma Green, Preparing for High-impact, Low-
probability Events: Lessons from Eyjafjallajökull, A CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT (Jan. 2012), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environmen
t%20and%20Development/r0112_highimpact.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG7D-G77M]. 
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the operator according to which only the operator will be deemed to 
be exclusively liable for nuclear damage, a legal fiction created 
based on public policy in order to ensure the prompt compensation 
for victims by the operator and to avoid a legal imbroglio for the 
victims.  This was also driven by pragmatic concerns of the 
insurance sector to ensure that only the operator would need to take 
out insurance and not all the other suppliers involved in the 
construction of a nuclear installation and thereby allows “a 
concentration of the insurance capacity available.”4 
Without going in further detail we merely want to flag that 
the U.S.—though historically a major supporter and influencer of 
the international conventions relating to civil liability for nuclear 
damage which contain limited right of recourse grounds against 
suppliers, to protect the interests of U.S. supplier companies 
engaged in the nuclear energy sector in other countries—opted 
domestically for a system based on economic channelling in its 
Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, 1957 (Price-
Anderson Act), a system akin to legal channelling.5  Under this 
economic channelling model, the operator must take out an 
“omnibus coverage,” encompassing his own third-party liability as 
well as that of the suppliers, but where the right of victims to sue the 
supplier directly has remained intact (in line with general tort law).  
It is also noteworthy that the rationale of the principle of legal 
towards the operator, which by and large excludes the liability of 
the suppliers, is increasingly being questioned by certain authors.6 
Importantly, in domestic and international nuclear law, the 
operator of a nuclear installation will be held liable without a victim 
 
 4 For a detailed analysis of the nuclear liability principles: INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY 
AGENCY, HANDBOOK NUCLEAR LAW 109-16 (2003) [hereinafter IAEA]; pertaining to Paris 
regime, see also Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability, NUCLEAR ENERGY 
AGENCY, https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-convention.html [https://perma.cc/WM5T-
3EG4]. 
 5 The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 
576 (1957). 
 6 See generally Evelyne Ameye, Channelling of Nuclear Third Party Liability 
Towards the Operator: Is it Sustainable in a Developing Nuclear World or Is There a Need 
for Liability of Nuclear Architects and Engineers?, 19 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 33 
(2010); Evelyne M. Ameye, United States and India: Two Nuclear States with Legislation 
That Truly Holds Responsible Parties Liable in Case of a Nuclear Accident, 18 J. RISK 
RESEARCH 1070 (2014),  
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13669877.2014.971421 
[https://perma.cc/7C9H-GPG2]. 
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establishing the negligence of the operator.  This principle of strict 
liability is an important alleviation of the burden of proof otherwise 
resting on a plaintiff.  As we will discuss below, this principle of 
strict or absolute liability governs the legal relationship between the 
operator and the victim, but not that of the operator vis-à-vis the 
supplier when the operator relies on his right of recourse, which is 
elaborately discussed in the later sections. 
As is well-known, the Indian Supreme Court adopted the 
far-reaching environmental liability concept of absolute liability for 
enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities.  
The enterprises will be held absolutely liable to compensate those 
affected by an accident (for instance, in the case of accidental 
leakage of a toxic gas) and such liability will not be subject to any 
of the exceptions (that is, act of God, act of third party, consent of 
victim and statutory authority) under the tort principle of strict 
liability in Rylands v Fletcher.7  Hence, the notion of strict liability 
is not unique to the nuclear energy sector as such but can be found 
back in many jurisdictions when the civil liability of industries 
engaged in inherently hazardous activities is addressed, albeit with 
high-impact, low-probability type incidents related to these sectors. 
Another nuclear law principle which in some way is a 
corollary or a trade-off of the unique legal channelling mechanism 
is that the liability of the operator will be limited both in amount as 
well as in time.  Under the general tort law, there would not be such 
a capped liability amount for a defendant, and the only time 
limitation would be the one calculated as per the respective general 
laws of limitation applicable to tort laws, predefining the time 
within which any plaintiff would need to file its claim for damages.  
The limitation of liability in amount for the operator, necessarily 
implies that the State will step in and pay compensation to the 
victims in case the compensation amounts exceed the statutory 
determined liability amounts of the operator, an aspect which is 
often explicitly addressed in domestic laws, including in the CLND 
Act.8 
Other nuclear liability principles which one finds in the 
nuclear liability conventions are: the need for the operator to have 
an insurance or other financial security covering its specified 
 
 7 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 (India). 
 8 IAEA, supra note 4, at 113; see also CLND Act, supra note 1, at §7. 
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liability amount at all times, which is often referred to as the 
congruence principle between liability and coverage; and which has 
also been embedded in the CLND Act.9 
To further ensure smooth handling in case of claims by 
victims in the event of a nuclear incident, the nuclear liability 
conventions require that each country clearly ensures that only one 
court or body with the necessary authority will have jurisdiction 
over such cases.10  The CLND Act provides that the Claims 
Commissioner or the Nuclear Damage Claims Commission will be 
adjudicating such claims.11  Because many domestic laws pertaining 
to civil liability for nuclear damage may not necessarily address 
jurisdictional aspects in the event of a nuclear incident with 
transboundary ramifications (but to which their domestic private 
international law principles would apply), the nuclear conventions 
effectively harmonize this aspect by requiring that only courts of the 
State in which the nuclear incident occurs will, as a general rule, 
have jurisdiction.  Moreover, these conventions mandate 
compliance with another nuclear law principle, to know, the non-
discrimination principle, whereby domestic laws and the civil 
liability for nuclear damage conventions must apply equally to all 
victims, regardless of their nationality, domicile or residence.12 
Because of the unique characteristics of some of these 
nuclear law principles which deviate from general tort law in very 
significant aspects, these international conventions and domestic 
legislations such as the CLND Act, must be viewed as lex specialis 
(from the Latin saying: lex specialis derogat legi generali, i.e. a 
specific law derogating from the general law).  Judges must take 
into account a rule of interpretation whereby the special law will 
prevail over the general law. 
It is rather beyond doubt that the CLND Act fully 
incorporates the basic nuclear liability principles discussed above, to 
know: (1) legal channelling of liability towards the operator; (2) 
strict liability of the operator; (3) limitation of liability in amount; 
(4) limitation of liability in time; (5) congruence of liability and 
coverage; and (6) exclusive jurisdiction.  However, as we will 
discuss in depth in the sections below: Section 17(b) of the CLND 
 
 9 IAEA, supra note 4, at 114; see also CLND Act, supra note 1, at §8. 
 10 IAEA, supra note 4, at 115. 
 11 CLND Act, supra note 1, at pts. III & V. 
 12 IAEA, supra note 4, at 115. 
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Act expands the right of recourse ground of the operator against the 
supplier compared to the Paris and Vienna regimes beyond 
situations which the parties contractually agreed.  It is precisely this 
open-ended nature of the right of recourse provision under the 
CLND Act beyond the scope of the operator-supplier contract, 
including, for instance, the contractual defect liability period, that 
has had a dampening effect on the potential suppliers and the global 
insurance industry to confidently enter the nuclear energy sector in 
India. 
Public policy discussions pertaining to the soundness of 
excluding the nuclear energy sector from general tort law principles 
can be traced back to the 1950s before the adoption of the 
international conventions addressing civil liability for nuclear 
damage, which we will discuss further below.  Some of these pro-
and-contra views were echoed in the Parliamentary debates before 
the adoption of the CLND Act, which we will briefly touch upon as 
well. 
II. RIGHT OF RECOURSE UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION, 
PARIS CONVENTION AND CSC 
As per Article X of the 1997 Vienna Convention, adopted 
under the IAEA regime: “the operator shall have a right of recourse 
only—(a) if this is expressly provided for by a contract in writing; 
or (b) if the nuclear incident results from an act or omission done 
with intent to cause damage, against the individual who has acted or 
omitted to act with such intent.”13  It further states that the right of 
recourse provided for under this Article may also be extended to 
benefit the Installation State insofar as it has provided public funds 
pursuant to this Convention.14 
Article 6(f) of the 1960 Paris Convention (as amended), 
adopted under the auspices of the OECD, according to which the 
operator shall have a right of recourse only: “i. if the damage caused 
 
 13 IAEA, Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, IAEA Doc. 
INFCIRC/500 (Mar. 20, 1996) (adopted in 1963), amended by IAEA, Protocol to Amend 
the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/566 
(July 22, 1998) (entered into force in 2003), 
https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/protocol-amend-vienna-convention-
civil-liability-nuclear-damage [https://perma.cc/53MS-GRGP]. 
       14 Id. 
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by a nuclear incident results from an act or omission done with 
intent to cause damage, against the individual acting or omitting to 
act with such intent; ii. if and to the extent that it is so provided 
expressly by contract.”15 
India is not a party to either the Paris or the Vienna regime, 
but it did ratify the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage, 1997 (“CSC”) on 4 February 2016, which entered 
into force in 2015.16  The CSC is open not only to States that are 
parties to either the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage or the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in 
the Field of Nuclear Energy, but also to other States provided that 
their national legislation is consistent with uniform rules on civil 
liability laid down in the Annex to the Convention.17  Hence, India 
is an “Annex State” in the context of the CSC. 
The right of recourse provision in the Annex to the CSC 
(Article 10), just like under the Vienna and Paris Conventions, 
foresees only two situations wherein the operator would have a right 
of recourse, to know:  
National law may provide that the operator shall 
have a right of recourse only: 
(a) If this is expressly provided for by a contract 
in writing; or 
(b) If the nuclear incident results from an act or 
omission done with the intent to cause damage, 
against the individual who has acted or omitted to act 
with such intent.18 
 
 15 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (1960), in 
particular Article 6(f), as supplemented by the Brussels Supplementary Convention of 
1963 (BSC), and revised by the Additional Protocol of 1964 and the Protocol of 1982, 
under the auspices of the OECD (note that the 2004 Protocols to amend the Paris 
Convention and the BSC are not yet in force), https://www.oecd-
nea.org/law/nlparis_conv.html [https://perma.cc/4HKR-US4E] and https://www.oecd-
nea.org/law/paris-convention-protocol.html [https://perma.cc/WFQ9-WT6M]. 
 16 IAEA, Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, IAEA 
Doc. INFCIRC/567 (Jul. 22 1997), https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc567.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T38N-P4MX]. 
 17 IAEA, supra note 4. 
        18  IAEA, supra note 16, at 38. 
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As we will further discuss in detail below, the CLND Act has 
quite uniquely inserted a third stand-alone ground, independent of 
any contractual agreement between the operator and the supplier 
with regard to the right of recourse, if the nuclear incident has 
resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, 
which includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent 
defects or sub-standard services. 
McRae explains when reflecting upon the CSC negotiations, 
that not each CSC provision was intended to be equally mandatory, 
albeit that for “some provisions and definitions, however, it was 
determined that their treatment needed to be exactly the same in all 
member countries in order to support an effective and protective 
global regime.  These provisions and definitions (relating primarily 
to compensation, jurisdiction, and the definition of nuclear damage) 
were included in the body of the CSC so that all member countries 
must comply with them.”19  Conversely, for other provisions it was 
understood that there could be domestic variations and they would 
not need to be identical.20  Similarly, the IAEA’s Explanatory Text 
to the CSC when touching upon the need to adopt national 
legislation clearly distinguishes the different clauses in the Annex, 
many of which cannot be treated as self-executing.  More 
specifically, when referring to Article 10 of the CSC on the right of 
recourse, the chapeau states: “National law may provide that the 
operator shall have a right of recourse only: ( . . . ),” which gives 
each Annex State “the faculty to complement, or derogate from the 
Annex’s provisions; in these cases, it is for each Contracting Party, 
nuclear or non-nuclear, to decide whether or not it is its interest to 
exercise this faculty.”21 
Upon ratification, the Indian Government submitted the 
following statement: 
The Government of India, in accordance with 
paragraph 1 of Article XVIII of the Convention, 
 
 19 Ben McRae, The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage: Catalyst for a Global Nuclear Liability Regime, 1 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 17, 24 
(2007). 
        20 Id. 
 21 See CARLTON STOIBER ET AL., HANDBOOK ON NUCLEAR LAW (2003); International 
Atomic Energy Agency, The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage—Explanatory Texts, 3 IAEA INT’L L. SERIES (2017). 
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declares that its national law complies with the 
provisions of the Annex to the Convention; India has 
enacted the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 
of 2010 to provide for civil liability for nuclear 
damage and prompt compensation to the victims of a 
nuclear incident through a no-fault liability regime 
channelling liability to the operator, appointment of 
Claims Commissioner, establishment of Nuclear 
Damage Claims Commission and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto.  The Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010 complies 
with the provisions of the Annex to the Convention 
on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage.22 
Importantly, the brief reference above to the right of 
recourse provisions in the Vienna Convention, Paris Convention, 
and CSC entails that such recourse by the operator against a supplier 
is very much acknowledged under both the Vienna and Paris 
regimes.  However, in business practice, a right of recourse clause is 
typically not inserted in the operator-supplier contracts.  On the 
contrary, exculpatory contract clauses or “hold harmless” clauses 
will typically be negotiated whereby the operator of a nuclear power 
plant will agree contractually to defend, indemnify and hold 
harmless the supplier against any loss, liability, damage, or claim, 
resulting from any recourse by any third party against the supplier, 
arising out of a nuclear incident in connection with their contracts.  
This further explains the unease with which the nuclear business 
community looks at the expansion of the right of recourse under the 
CLND Act. 
Similarly, even bilateral agreements tend to exclude a right 
of recourse provision, thereby making such right of recourse clauses 
much less common than perhaps generally assumed.23 
 
 22 IAEA, Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, (Feb. 4, 
2016), 
https://wwwlegacy.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp_reserv.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2U3D-NGZ8]. 
 23 See e.g. PRE-LEGISLATIVE BRIEFING SERVICE (PLBS) (NOW: VIDHI), ADDENDUM TO 
A BRIEFING DOCUMENT ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE BILL, 2010: 
QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS OPEN TO PARLIAMENT 56 
(2010), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss2/3
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Perhaps this prevalent business practice in most jurisdictions 
not to insert right of recourse clauses in operator-supplier contracts 
should not come as such a surprise when one reviews the concerns 
and suggestion on how to avoid supplier liability from the business 
and insurance industry in the days before the adoption of the 
liability for nuclear damage conventions.  Indeed, several insightful 
papers have analysed the historical origins of the limited right of 
recourse approach as part of the Harvard Report 
recommendations.24 
The comprehensive Harvard Report, published in 1959, was 
undertaken as a joint collaboration between the nuclear industry and 
academia.25  In its Chapter on Private Arrangements to Limit 
Suppliers’ Liability, it stated that: 
[O]ne of the most widely discussed means by which 
a supplier may seek to protect himself against 
liability to third persons is the so-called ‘hold-
harmless clause.’  In its simplest form, this is an 
undertaking by the purchaser of the equipment, the 
licensee, or the operator of the atomic installation, by 
which he assumes the financial responsibility for any 
claims, of whatever nature and by whomever 
asserted, which may be established against the 
supplier on account of equipment or services 
furnished by the latter to the installation.  This clause 
 
https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/2011/11/18/PLBS_Addendum%2520on%2520Civil%2520Nucle
ar%2520Liability%2520Bill [https://perma.cc/U8TX-WEHL] [hereinafter PLBS 
ADDENDUM] (referring by way of example to Article III the France-Russian Federation 
Agreement (2000) and Article 1 of the Germany-Russian Federation Agreement (1998). 
See also Gopalan Balachandran, Should India Sign the Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation?, INST. FOR DEF. STUD. & ANALYSES (Oct. 26, 2010), 
https://idsa.in/system/files/IB_IndiaCSV.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ6G-RCEJ] (referring to 
Art. 13. of the India-Russia Intergovernmental Agreement which states that: “The Indian 
side and its authorized organization at any time and at all stages of the construction and 
operation of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units to be constructed shall be the operator of 
the power units of the NPP and be fully responsible for any damage both within and 
outside the territory of the Republic of India caused to any person and property as a result 
of a nuclear incident during the transportation, handling or storage outside the NPPs of the 
nuclear fuel and contaminated materials or any part of NPP equipment both within and 
outside the territory of the Republic of India”). 
 24 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
AGAINST NUCLEAR RISK 95 (1959) [hereinafter HARVARD REPORT]. 
 25 Id. 
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seeks to put the purchaser or operator in the position 
of an insurer of the supplier’s risk of liability.26 
The Harvard Report further discusses some of the 
challenges and limitations (including in the absence of a 
legal/economic channelling regime) before concluding that 
“suppliers cannot adequately protect themselves against many of the 
risks of excessive liability inherent in atomic enterprises.  
Legislative or treaty action would seem to be called for.”27  The next 
Chapter of the Harvard Report then enumerates the areas where it 
believes Government action would be desirable, starting with the 
limitation of liability of the operator, while referring to similar 
approaches in the aviation and maritime sectors, but also supporting 
the principle that the operator’s liability should be based on strict 
liability.28 
The Harvard Report further addresses the need to limit the 
liability of suppliers as well, anticipating protracted litigation 
against operators and suppliers in the absence of a special regime as 
“[l]itigation for that purpose will nevertheless be harassing and its 
outcome might possibly be prejudiced by adverse public 
sentiment.”29  Therefore, the Harvard Report concludes  
[C]learly some corrective action is needed if the 
manufacturing industry is expected to participate fully 
in nuclear development.  This does not necessarily 
mean that suppliers should be entirely exonerated 
from the consequences of any fault on their part.  But 
the public should look, for recovery in tort, to the 
security fund established by the operator.  Tort 
recovery outside that fund would result in a 
pyramiding of insurance costs, multiple recoveries, 
harassing and often fruitless litigation . . .. 
It continued by explaining that if “the operator is required to carry 
compulsory insurance covering himself and his suppliers, then the 
question of who is formally liable loses much of its practical 
importance.”30  This, of course, reflects the construction adopted 
 
 26 Id. at 42. 
 27 Id. at 44. 
 28 Id. at 45. 
 29 Id. at 56. 
 30 Id. at 57. 
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under the US Price-Anderson Act, 1957, where victims can sue 
suppliers, but their liability is covered by the omnibus coverage of 
the nuclear operator.31  Hence, with regard to the section on 
exclusion of recourse actions in the Harvard Report, it states that 
“[w]here actions against suppliers are not excluded, the insurance 
industry would understandably prefer the Anderson-Price system, 
under which operators and suppliers are covered by the same 
insurance policy, for which the premiums are presumably paid by 
the operator.”32  And, as a practical matter, “recourse suits by the 
operator or by his insurers would, therefore, lack substance and 
would consist of mere bookkeeping operations of the insurer.”33  
We may merely flag here that the “joint risk management” 
mechanism being proposed under the newly created India Nuclear 
Insurance Pool (INIP), which we will discuss in the last chapter of 
this Note, although very distinct from the Price-Anderson approach, 
is common to the Price-Anderson approach in that it ultimately 
seeks to move the potential operator-supplier right of recourse 
claims out of the realm of litigation before regular civil courts and 
into the field of a purely internal insurance settlement. 
Most importantly, this 1959 Harvard Report concludes that 
the “retention of a right of recourse seems neither justified nor 
desirable, except perhaps in the extremely limited category of 
intentional damage.”34  These US business concerns and positions 
as expressed in the Harvard Report, undoubtedly would have 
influenced the delegations in their discussions and negotiations of 
the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. 
As Faure and Vanden Borre explain, both with regard to the 
1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Vienna Convention, the 
argument according to which the right of recourse by the nuclear 
operator ought to be curtailed was heavily influenced by the 
reasoning that otherwise each supplier would have to insure himself 
against the same risk already covered by the operator’s insurance 
and “involve a costly duplication of insurance with no benefit to the 
 
 31 To read more about the US Price Anderson Act, see Michael G. Faure & Tom 
Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of the 
U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WILLIAM & MARY ENVTL L. & POL’Y REV. 
219 (2008). 
        32 HARVARD REPORT, supra note 24, at 57. 
 33 HARVARD REPORT, supra note 24, at 57 n.20. 
 34 HARVARD REPORT, supra note 24, at 58. 
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victims.”35  This is precisely the complaint raised by many in the 
international nuclear business and insurance sector against the 
unique insurance mechanism being proposed by INIP in India, as 
will be discussed below. 
Turning back to the negotiations of the 1963 Vienna 
Convention, Faure and Vanden Borre discuss how an amendment 
was tabled with the proposal to allow the right of recourse by the 
operator against any person having manufactured materials or 
equipment or offered services in connection with the design, 
construction, repair or operation of the nuclear installation.36  Under 
this amendment, the operator would have a right of recourse against 
his supplier only if he proved the negligence of the supplier based 
on general rules of tort law.  However, there was a lot of resistance 
against this amendment, warning that in such a case the “promotion 
of the atomic industry would be seriously jeopardised if the 
amendment were adopted.”37  The proposed amendment was 
ultimately rejected (including by the US, UK, Canada, Germany, 
former USSR).38  Interestingly, the Official Records IAEA 
pertaining to the convention negotiations, indicate that India along 
with Argentina, Brazil and the UAE initially supported the insertion 
of this amendment, but that India ultimately did not vote in favour of 
it.39 
Not unlike the discussions which took place in these 
international fora, the parliamentary debates of India’s lower house 
shed a fascinating light on the underlying concerns pertaining to this 
right of recourse concept, as we will further discuss below. 
Lastly, we may add that other Conventions pertaining to 
other sectors where the owner/operator may be held strictly liable 
and against which all civil liability claims will be channelled also 
acknowledge the right of recourse against third parties (although 
these sectors and related insurance mechanisms may be structured 
 
 35 MICHAEL G. FAURE AND TOM VANDEN BORRE, STUDY ON THE INFLUENCE OF PLANT 
LIFETIME EXTENSION (PLEX) ON NUCLEAR LIABILITY 26 (2013) ,available at: 
https://secured-
static.greenpeace.org/france/PageFiles/300718/Study%20%20PLEX%20nuclear%20liabili
ty.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXR6-VFLK] [hereinafter FAURE & BORRE, PLEX STUDY] 
(referencing Exposé des Motifs, Motif 18, of the Paris Convention). 
 36 Id. at 26–27. 
 37 Id.. 
 38 Id. 
 39 PLBS ADDENDUM, supra note 23, at 5–6. 
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differently); such as is the case with the civil liability for oil 
pollution damage40 or civil liability regarding the international 
carriage of persons, baggage, or cargo performed by aircrafts.41  In 
some of these conventions, however, the right of recourse provision 
of the owner/carrier is drafted in a much more open-ended manner, 
stated along the lines of “nothing in this Convention shall prejudice 
any right of recourse of the owner against third parties.” 42  Thus, 
the right of recourse of the owner/operator in some of the 
conventions regulating similar low probability but high 
impact/liability exposure industries, is not limited to a few grounds. 
III. SECTION 17 OF THE CLND ACT: INSERTING A THIRD 
GROUND FOR RIGHT OF RECOURSE FOR THE OPERATOR 
AND RELATED PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 
Section 17 of the CLND Act states that  
[The] operator of the nuclear installation, after 
paying the compensation for nuclear damage in 
accordance with Section 6, shall have a right of 
recourse where— 
(a) such right is expressly provided for in a 
contract in writing; 
(b) the nuclear incident has resulted as a 
consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, 
which includes supply of equipment or material with 
patent or latent defects or sub-standard services; 
 
 40 UNITED NATIONS, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR SHIP-SOURCE OIL POLLUTION: 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE 
FROM TANKERS 142–43 (2012) 
 41 The number of aviation conventions are many, and, hence, the reference to the 
1999 Montreal Convention and its right of recourse provision is singled out as a specific 
illustration. See ICAO, CURRENT LISTS OF PARTIES TO MULTILATERAL AIR LAW TREATIES, 
https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Lists/Current%20lists%20of%20parties/AllItems.asp
x [https://perma.cc/64ZL-VMGB]. 
 42 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage art 3, Nov. 
27, 1992 , I.L.M.; Montreal Convention of 1999 art. 37, May 28, 1999 (demonstrating 
open-ended language of recourse in the context of air carrier liability); see also GIUSEPPE 
CONTISSA AND GIOVANNI SARTOR, LIABILITIES AND AUTOMATION IN AVIATION 3 (2012) 
(explaining the possibility of recourse in the context of aviation). 
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(c) the nuclear incident has resulted from an act 
of commission or omission of an individual done 
with the intent to cause nuclear damage. 
As mentioned, Sections 17(a) and (c) of the CLND Act are 
standard provisions and can be compared directly with Article X of 
the Vienna Convention, Article 6(f) of the Paris Convention, and 
even Article 10 of the Annex to the CSC.  Moreover, each of these 
international conventions restrict the right of recourse to the two 
instances outlined in Section 17(a) and 17(c) only.  Therefore, the 
insertion of Section 17(b)—beyond the two “classic” ground of 
recourse grounds—has caused much international consternation. 
Indeed, there are a few other domestic legislations which 
contain right of recourse provisions which slightly differ from the 
Paris and Vienna Conventions language but are similar in approach.  
For instance, the Republic of Korea in its 1969 Act on 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage (as amended in 2001) states in 
its Article 4 on the Right of Recourse: 
(1) Where nuclear damage is caused by the wilful 
act or gross negligence of a third party, a nuclear 
operator who has provided compensation for nuclear 
damage in accordance with Article 3, shall have a 
right of recourse against such third party, provided 
however, that where the nuclear damage occurs due 
to the supply of material or services (including 
labour) for the operation of a nuclear reactor 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘supply of material’), the 
nuclear operator shall have a right of recourse only 
insofar as there has been a wilful act or gross 
negligence by the supplier of the materials concerned 
or by his employees. 
(2) If, in the circumstanced described in 
paragraph 1 of this Article, a special agreement has 
been made regarding rights of recourse, such 
agreement shall govern.43 
 
 43 Nuclear Safety Act, Act No. 10911, July 25, 2011 (S. Kor.). 
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The original Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, 2010, 
contained a differently worded Section 17(b), targeting the situation 
in which “the nuclear incident has resulted from the wilful act or 
gross negligence on the part of the supplier of the material, 
equipment or services, or of his employee,” much like the law of the 
Republic of Korea just quoted.  However, during deliberations 
before the Parliamentary Standing Committee, various experts 
expressed the view that this provision needed to be redrafted in line 
with provisions from product liability laws with a lower evidentiary 
threshold compared to the situations of gross negligence that hold 
the supplier liable for product liability, faulty design, faulty 
manufacture, etc.44  The Parliamentary Standing Committee shared 
the view of the experts according to which it would be impossible to 
establish the “willful act or gross negligence” on the part of the 
supplier45  and that therefore, “there should be a clear cut liability on 
the supplier of nuclear equipment/material in case they are found to 
be defective.”46 
As a result, the Parliamentary Committee suggested that 
Clause 17(a) and 17(b) be connected with the word “and.”  This 
proposal was ultimately not upheld by Parliament in the final 
version of the CLND Act, but it clarifies that initially the intent was 
to hyphen both sections, and that the right of recourse grounds as 
foreseen in Section 17(b) would only apply if there was also a 
contractual right of recourse clause agreed between the operator and 
the supplier; and not in the absence of it.47  In other words: the 
Committee did not envisage that Section 17(b) would become a 
stand-alone clause, independent of an explicit contractual right of 
recourse clause.  This is further borne out by the Committee’s 
statement according to which the operator “may, after, 
compensating the victims, exercise his right of recourse against the 
 
 44 Robert J. Gruendel & Els Reynaers Kini, Through the Looking Glass: Placing 
India’s New Civil Liability Regime for Nuclear Damage in Context, NUCLEAR LAW 
BULLETIN, No. 89, 49–50 (2012). ELS REYNAERS KINI, CANADA LAW BOOK (Stanley 
Berger et al. eds, 2014). For original sources, see DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT & FORESTS, 212TH 
REPORT ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE BILL 5 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT 
PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE]. 
 45 REPORT PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 44, at 16. 
 46 Id. 
 47 REPORT PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 44. 
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supplier in accordance with the provisions of the contract.”48  
Therefore, the Committee assumed that such an explicit contractual 
right of recourse provision would be a standard clause in operator-
supplier contracts; whereas, as we have mentioned above, this is 
generally not the case in supplier contracts in the nuclear energy 
sector.  Quite the contrary: hold harmless clauses by the operator in 
favour of the supplier are the norm globally, not right of recourse 
clauses. 
The Parliamentary Standing Committee ultimately 
recommended that Section 17(b) should be modified as: “the 
nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of latent or patent 
defect, supply of subs-standard material, defective equipment or 
service, or from the gross negligence on the part of the supplier of 
the material, equipment or services.”49  In short, in this version the 
product liability language was placed in addition to the eventuality 
of “gross negligence.” 
Importantly, the revised language Section 17(b) in the 
CLND Bill presented to Parliament did not contain the connecting 
term “and” between Section 17(a) and (b), but instead read as “the 
nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an act or supplier 
or his employees, done with the intent to cause nuclear damage, and 
such act includes supply of equipment or material with patent or 
latent defects or sub-standard services;  . . . .”50 
In Parliament, one found a lot of criticism on the initial 
recommendation by the Parliamentary Committee to connect 
Section 17(a) and (b)—which was anyway not retained in the 
revised version of the Bill presented to Parliament, as well as on the 
new inclusion of the “intent” element in the final version of the 
Bill.51  If one were to summarise the observations from various 
 
 48 REPORT PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 44, at 16. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Italics added to emphasize the portion which was not retained in the final CLND 
Act. 
 51 LOK SABHA DEBATES, FIFTEENTH SERIES, VOL. XII, FIFTH SESSION, 2010/1932 
(SAKA) NO. 22, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 25, 2010/ BHADRA 3, 1932 (SAKA) (2010) (inter alia: 
“When the original Clause was amended further and when there was a suggestion in the 
Standing Committee for strengthening Clause 17, what the Government did surreptitiously 
was that they added one word ‘and’, and this particular word ‘and’ changed the entire 
meaning of that Clause. When there was hue and cry, uproar outside Parliament, then the 
Government removed the word ‘and’ and put another word ‘intent’ which further 
weakened that Clause. If that word ‘intent’ remains in the Clause, how can anybody prove 
the intent of the supplier?”). 
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parties regarding Section 17(b), it would be that the government 
should not absolve the supplier from liability, and, consequently, the 
“intent” qualification was vehemently opposed by most as it 
“substantially nullifies the supplier’s responsibility.”52 
Other suggestions put forward to the Parliamentary 
Committee reviewing the Original Bill, consisted of enlarging the 
right of recourse in terms of the actors who could rely on such a 
recourse.53  Given that India has adopted a capped liability structure 
for the operator54 with the remaining compensation amount to be 
paid to the victims to be provided for by the Central Government, it 
was proposed that the Central Government should also be entitled to 
rely on this right of recourse provision against the supplier for the 
differential amount.55  As observed by the authors previously, it 
“does tend to show that in fact a rather innovative review of the 
notion of recourse against the supplier itself took place during the 
public debate phase of the CLND Act.”56 
Most parliamentarians were made aware that there were only 
few countries with an extended right of recourse provision and that 
this could impede their accession to standard third party civil 
liability agreements, in particular the CSC, which the Government 
may want to join at some point.  However, the joining of the CSC 
was not seen as a priority by Parliamentarians at the time, and many 
felt India could not be rushed or bullied into doing so.  In short, it 
was felt that the compatibility of the CLND Act and the CSC would 
be dealt with if and when India would need to cross that bridge.  
Some went as far as stating that it ultimately was a “buyer’s 
market,” and India should have the courage to dictate its terms.57  
Only some lone voices expressed a concern that the law should not 
be made so stringent as to scare away investors altogether,58 but that 
possibility didn’t seem to carry the weight it now does. 
If the above discussions were not controversial enough, 
perhaps it is worth noting by way of historical addendum that 
 
 52 CANADA LAW BOOK, supra note 44, at 117–118. 
 53 See PLBS ADDENDUM, supra note 23, at 16. 
 54 Article 6(2) of the CLND Act, according to which “the liability of an operator for 
each nuclear incident shall be (a) in respect of nuclear reactors having thermal power equal 
to or above ten MW Rupees one thousand five hundred Crores.” 
 55 CLND Act, supra note 1, at art. 7. 
 56 CANADA LAW BOOK, supra note 44, at 118. 
 57 LOK SABHA DEBATES, supra note 51. 
 58 Id. 
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several parliamentarians discussed the possibility of adopting an 
unlimited liability regime or placing the liability amount at a much 
more significant level.  Nevertheless, the proposed amendment to 
place the liability amount as high as Rs. 10,000 Crores (USD 1.65 
billion) was ultimately voted against by a vast majority.59 
In light of the above parliamentary debates which went at 
great length in defining the precise contours of the right of recourse 
provision, courts when faced with an interpretation of Section 17(b) 
and relying on “external aids” would necessarily need to conclude 
that Parliament in the end wanted to both expand and disconnect 
Section 17(b) from the existence of any contractually agreed right of 
recourse provision.  That is, courts would need to apply it, even if 
the parties had decided not to insert a contractual right of recourse 
clause as per Section 17(a).60 
Quite clearly, the discussions pertaining to the operator’s 
right of recourse did not take the existing Paris or Vienna regimes 
on civil liability for nuclear damage as a starting point.  Rather, the 
Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee states that it “has 
been the unanimous opinion of the Committee that the Bill being a 
domestic legislation should reflect Indian interests.”61 
We must add that the subsequent CLND Rules tried to 
reduce the scope of the right of recourse somewhat by specifying in 
Rule 24(1) that with regard to the contract referred to in clause 
Section 17(a) of the Act, such contract shall include a provision for 
right of recourse for not less than the extent of the operator’s 
liability under Section 6(2) or the value of the contract itself, 
“whichever is less.”62  Rule 24(2) of the CLND Rules further 
specifies that the provision for the right of recourse referred to in 
Rule 24(1) shall be for the duration of the initial license issued 
under the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection Rules), 2004 (which 
is five years), or the product liability period, “whichever is 
longer.”63  The “product liability period” is defined in Rule 24 as 
“the period for which the supplier has undertaken liability for patent 
 
 59 Id. (merely 25 representatives voted in favour and 252 voted against this proposed 
amendment). 
 60 KINI, INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRADE, supra note 2, at 119. 
 61 REPORT PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 44, at 13. 
 62 GRUENDEL & KINI, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, supra note 2, at 51. 
 63 CLND Rules, supra note 1. 
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or latent defects or sub-standards services under a contract.”64  
Hence, this now does clearly allow suppliers to limit their exposure 
to a period of five years.  Rule 24 of the CLND Rules, with its sole 
reference to Section 17(a) of the CLND Act, where a right of 
recourse provision is expressly provided in a contract, clearly 
implies that for the two other situations covered under Section 17 of 
the CLND Act, there would be no such five-year time limit on the 
operator’s right of recourse. 
In other words: now that Section 17(a) and Section 17(b) of 
the CLND Act are not connected with the word “and”, due to which 
Section 17(b) must be treated as a stand-alone provision 
independent of a contractual right of recourse clause, the operator 
can exercise a right of recourse if a supply of equipment or material 
with patent defects, latent defects, or sub-standard services has been 
provided, thereby considerably broadening the scope of the right of 
recourse of the operator under the law in India.65 
As we have seen, a significant part of the Parliamentary 
debates and expert submissions were devoted to adapting the notion 
of the right of recourse of the operator against the supplier to the 
Indian context and not merely to accept the standard language used 
in treaties.  While it was noted that expanding the right of recourse 
provision may not be in line with what is generally prescribed in 
international treaties on civil liability for nuclear damage, the more 
persuasive common ground across party lines was that an operator 
should effectively be placed in a position to sue a supplier if it could 
be established that he would have supplied sub-par equipment or 
services.66 
Some of this debate is reminiscent of the original discussions 
which took place before the adoption of the Vienna Convention in 
1963, in which India took part and initially supported a version of 
the right of recourse provision where the operator could exercise the 
 
 64 Rule 24(2)(b) further contains an “explanation” of the term “supplier” which “shall 
include a person who— 
(i)Manufactures and supplies, either directly or through an agent, a system, equipment or 
component or builds a structure on the basis of functional specification; or 
(ii)Provides build to print or detailed design specifications to a vendor for manufacturing a 
system, equipment or component or building a structure and is responsible to the operator 
for design and quality assurance; or 
(iii)Provides quality assurance or design services.”  CLND Rules, supra note 1. 
 65 GRUENDEL & KINI, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, supra note 2, at 51. 
 66 KINI, INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRADE, supra note 2, at 119–121. 
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right of recourse “against any person who has manufactured 
materials or equipment for, or who has furnished materials, 
equipment or services in connection with the design, construction, 
repair or operator of a nuclear installation, or who has transported or 
stored nuclear material, for fault of such person”.67  As is known, 
this version didn’t see the light of day, and other concerns,  
particularly pertaining to the spiraling cost and multiplication of 
insurance premiums, were more persuasive at that time.68   
Remarkably, these financial implications for the suppliers or the 
nuclear sector more generally merely formed a vague background in 
the Indian parliamentary debates, and not a single elected 
representative defended this economic point of view, and, thus, was 
almost entirely ignored.  This is in stark contrast with the focus of 
the Harvard Report which was adopted in 1959 and has since cast 
such a persuasive shadow on international nuclear civil liability 
law.69  The Harvard Report in its foreword admitted that it 
“inevitably reflects its American origin by its emphasis upon the 
special problems of the US supplier . . . .”70  The discussions in the 
Indian Parliament, almost 65 years after the publication of the 
Harvard Report, clearly placed the public interest on the forefront 
and arrived at an entirely different outcome in terms of the burden 
to be shouldered by a supplier in the nuclear sector.71 
In fact, the more direct implications of Section 17(b) for the 
suppliers were never really analyzed, and many may not have fully 
grasped that in fact suppliers worldwide have never had to take out 
an insurance for their services/deliveries to a nuclear operator.  
Indeed, as has been highlighted by several authors, industry reality 
indicates that a contractual right of recourse clause is never inserted 
in the contractual arrangement between a nuclear operator and its 
 
 67 PLBS ADDENDUM, supra note 23, at 5–6. 
 68 Id. For further analysis, see FAURE & BORRE, PLEX STUDY, supra note 35, at ¶¶ 
70–73; and AMEYE, supra note 6. 
 69 PLBS ADDENDUM, supra note 23, at 5–6. 
 70 The foreword further states: “Moreover, we believe that the examination of the 
subject as it appears to the US supplier in the light of American law will be of value in 
other nations which will be dealing with US suppliers in coming years.” 
 71 See, e.g. LOK SABHA DEBATES, supra note 51 (Mr. Prithviraj Chavan presenting the 
CLND Act: “I would like to take this opportunity to clarify one thing. While the limits of 
compensation are primarily for taking insurance, you cannot have insurance with no limits, 
but the compensation is, in fact, unlimited. I want the House to note this fact, whatever the 
compensation the Commissioner or the Commission will set, that compensation will be 
paid.”) 
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suppliers; bilateral agreements between countries exclude such a 
possibility or other dynamics drive this reality.72 
This raises the more poignant question whether the right of 
recourse concept itself attracts sufficient review in international fora 
regarding its true function, aim, utility, and ultimately underlying 
policy.  Whether or not one agrees with its implications, the Indian 
parliamentary debates have the advantage of at least having given 
the right of recourse notion a contemporary review, based on the 
assumption that the Indian operator would very often not have the 
contractual upper hand when negotiating this particular clause with 
a supplier.73 
IV. RIGHT OF RECOURSE OF OPERATOR AGAINST SUPPLIER 
UNDER SECTION 17(B) BASED ON TORT LAW 
There are a couple of key elements that must be culled out 
from Section 17(b) CLND Act, according to which the “operator of 
the nuclear installation, after paying the compensation for nuclear 
damage in accordance with Section 6, shall have a right of recourse 
where . . . the nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an 
act of supplier or his employee, which includes supply of equipment 
or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services.”74 
We stated from the outset that nuclear law is a lex specialis 
carved out from standard tort law (see discussion above), precisely 
because it focuses on speedy compensation for victims and seeks to 
avoid year-long litigation where victims have to prove the fault of 
the operator or any of its suppliers.  However, as much as the strict 
liability of the operator and the channelling of the liability towards 
the operator deviates from standard tort law principles, the same 
cannot be said about the right of recourse provision where the 
operator will have to establish and prove the applicability of the 
situations covered under Section 17(b) before it can claim back the 
full or partial amount it paid to the victims based on the Award 
issued by the Claims Commissioner/Nuclear Damage Claims 
 
 72 PLBS ADDENDUM, supra note 23, at 13; AMEYE, supra note 6 (the author 
conducted a detailed study by sending questionnaires to about 50 operators and 50 
designers/constructors worldwide to collate their views on liability allocations in the 
nuclear sector). 
 73 KINI, INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRADE, supra note 2, at 121. 
 74 CLND Rules, supra note 1. 
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Commission.  In other words: whereas the victims do not have to 
establish fault of the operator, the operator will have to establish 
fault of the supplier which possibly either supplied equipment or 
material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services to 
successfully rely on its right of recourse. 
It must be noted here that the phrasing of Section 17(b) is 
such that it states “which includes” supply of equipment or material 
with patent or latent defects, or sub-standard services, and hence, is 
not limited to those situations.  This also implies if the contributory 
fault of the supplier in causing the nuclear incident can be 
established, Section 17(b) CLND Act can also be relied upon by the 
operator to claim back some or all of the money paid to the victims. 
It is also worth mentioning that whereas Section 17(c) 
explicitly refers to both the act of commission or omission, Section 
17(b) states that “the nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence 
or an act of supplier or his employee” seemingly excludes omissions 
which can’t quite be the case given that under general tort law 
principles the notion of an “act” of a liable party will cover both acts 
and omissions, as will be further discussed below. 
V. TORT LAW PRINCIPLES 
The principal aim of tort law is compensation of victims or 
their dependants.  The general principle of award of damages is, 
therefore, compensatory in nature.  At times, however, exemplary 
damages can be imposed, and in that case the aim is more for 
deterrence of wrong-doers.75 
An action for breach of contract necessitates privity between 
the parties to it, whereas in tort no such privity is needed.  
Importantly, the same act may amount to a tort as well as a breach 
of contract.  Hence, once it is established that there was a latent 
defect (which then subsequently contributed to the nuclear incident), 
this factual proof may both entail a breach of contract as well as a 
tort, although the consequences attached to each would differ.  As 
we have discussed above, the operator-supplier contracts in India do 
not contain clauses pertaining to liability in the event of a nuclear 
incident. 
 
 75 AKSHAY SAPRE, THE LAW OF TORTS 885 (LexisNexis 28th ed., 2018). 
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Indeed, before the adoption of the CLND Act and in the 
international practice of the nuclear field, the operator in India 
inserted standard clauses on “Indemnity Against Loss/Damage” in 
its contracts with suppliers, which stated that: “the Purchaser shall 
indemnify and hold harmless the Contractor in respect of Third 
Party life and Property damage claims arising out of nuclear event at 
Purchaser’s Site.”  However, after the adoption of the CLND Act, 
operator-supplier contracts no longer contain such hold harmless 
clauses.  Such hold harmless clauses are, of course, very significant 
otherwise as it is well-established that a liability in tort will not be 
admitted if its effect would be to permit the plaintiff to circumvent 
or escape a contractual exclusion or limitation of liability.76 
It is good to keep the basic elements of tort law in mind as 
we progress in our analysis.  As is known, an act which infringes a 
legal right is a wrongful act, but every wrongful act is not a tort.  To 
constitute a tort or civil injury the following elements must be 
present: 1) A wrongful act must be committed by a person; 2) The 
wrongful act must give rise to a legal damage or actual damage; and 
3) The wrongful act must be of such a nature as to give rise to a 
legal remedy in the form of an action for damages.77  The crucial 
test of a legally wrongful act is its prejudicial effect on the legal 
right of another.  Keep in mind that under the law of torts, the 
notion of “wrongful act” is used in a wide sense and includes both 
acts and omissions.  Importantly, to every right there corresponds an 
obligation or duty.  The duty with which the law of torts is 
concerned is the duty to abstain from causing an injury, to respect 
the property of others, and to use due diligence to avoid causing 
harm to others.78 
There are different types of torts, including trespass, 
nuisance and negligence, which have each led to separate streams of 
case law over the years.  Negligence is the breach of a duty caused 
by the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by 
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human 
affairs would do; or doing something which a prudent and 
reasonable man would not do.79  It is well-established that there are 
three constituent elements of negligence, which the plaintiff must 
 
 76 Id. at 9. 
 77 Id. at 13. 
 78 Id. at 25. 
 79 Id. at 462. 
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prove: (1) A legal duty to exercise due care (by the defendant 
towards the plaintiff); (2) breach of the said duty (by the defendant); 
and (3) consequential damage (suffered by the plaintiff).80  The test 
for deciding whether the defendant breached his duty is that of a 
reasonable or prudent man; albeit that this is a very contextual 
benchmark, where the particular sector and level of expertise of the 
defendant will be taken into account.  Indeed, the question to be 
asked with regard a person’s conducts is whether a prudent or 
careful or diligent man of his calling or business or expertise or skill 
would have undertaken the thing in question.  In other words: if a 
person holds himself out as being specially competent to do things 
requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if 
he fails to exhibit the care and skill of an expert in that business.81 
Another important difference between tort law and contract 
law is that many construction contracts contain clauses pertaining to 
liquidated damages, which provide a pre-determined ceiling in order 
to quantify damages which arise due to a breach of contract.  
Conversely, unliquidated damages are damages that are payable for 
a breach, the exact amount of which has not been pre-agreed.  
Importantly, when there is a pre-determined amount, there is no 
need to lead evidence to prove such damages unless the Court 
arrives at a conclusion that no damages are likely to arise from such 
breach.82   Indeed, in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., the Supreme 
Court of India held that: 
“ . . . it can be held that when a contract has been 
broken, the party who suffers by such breach is 
entitled to receive compensation for any loss which 
naturally arises in the usual course of things from 
such breach.  These sections further contemplate that 
if parties knew when they made the contract that a 
particular loss is likely to result from such breach, 
they can agree for payment of such compensation.  In 
such a case, there may not be any necessity of 
leading evidence for proving damages, unless the 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 485–487. 
 82 See ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India) (referring to the 
lengthy interpretation of Liquidated Damages and case law in this Judgment by the 
Supreme Court of India). 
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Court arrives at the conclusion that no loss is likely 
to occur because of such breach.  Further, in case 
where the Court arrives at the conclusion that the 
term contemplating damages is by way of penalty, 
the Court may grant reasonable compensation not 
exceeding the amount so named in the contract on 
proof of damages.  However, when the terms of the 
contract are clear and unambiguous then its meaning 
is to be gathered only from the words used therein.  
In a case where the agreement is executed by experts 
in the field, it would be difficult to hold that the 
intention of the parties was different from the 
language used therein. In such a case, it is for the 
party who contends that stipulated amount is not 
reasonable compensation, to prove the same.”83 
VI. LATENT DEFECTS: STANDARD CONTRACTUAL DEFECT 
LIABILITY PERIOD/ REMEDY BUT DISTINCT LIMITATION 
PERIODS FOR SECTION 17(B) CLAIMS 
A. Latent Defects And Latent Defects Liability Remedy As 
Contractually Defined 
Before we turn to the case law relating to the interpretation 
of “latent defects” it is important that we understand the typical 
meaning given to it in the context of contracts between the operator 
and supplier (Purchaser-Contractor). 
We will subsequently have to keep in mind different 
scenarios and timelines attached to these terminologies, as foreseen 
under contract and how it could be applied and interpreted to the 
stand-alone Clause 17(b) CLND Act with its clear intent given by 
Parliament to apply even independent of any contractual right of 
recourse provision. 
Here’s an overview in the Table below of key definitions 
typically inserted in supply of plant and equipment contracts in the 
 
 83 Id. 
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nuclear energy field in India, much in line with international 
practice pertaining to infrastructure contracts:84  
 
 
 84 Note: these standard definitions have been copied from standard General 
Conditions of Contract for Supply of Indigenous Stores, NPCIL, as used even after the 
adoption of the CLND Act. 
Term  Definition 
 
Latent Defect 
 
Shall mean a defect, inherently lying within the material or arising out 
of design deficiency, which do not manifest themselves and/or was not 
reasonably discoverable during the Defect Liability Period. 
 
Contractor’s 
General 
Obligation(remedy 
latent defects) 
 
The Contractor shall design (to the extent specified in the Contract), 
procure/ manufacture (including associated Purchases and/or sub-
contracting), install and complete the Facilities with due care and 
diligence in accordance with the Contract and with the Purchaser’s 
instructions, and shall remedy any defects in the Facilities occurring in 
Defect Liability Period, and remedy latent defects within a further 
period of five (5) years from end of the Defect Liability Period. 
 
Defect Liability 
 
The Contractor shall warrant that the Stores, Plant & Equipment 
supplied under the Contract shall be brand new, free from defects, 
manufactured with the latest state-of-art of manufacture and conform 
strictly in accordance with the technical specifications, drawings and 
data sheets of the Contract.  No deviation from these specifications or 
alteration shall be made without specific and written accord of the 
Purchaser.  All Stores shall be guaranteed to be of the best quality of 
their respective kinds and shall be free from defects in the design 
engineering, materials, workmanship, and be of specified size and 
capacity so as to fulfil in all respects the requirements of the Purchaser 
as specified in the Contract. 
 
Defect Liability 
Period 
 
a) Items/Equipment/System 
Defect Liability Period shall be 18 months from the date of completion 
of facilities (satisfactory erection and pre-commissioning) or 12 months 
from the date of Operational Acceptance of Facilities (Commissioning), 
whichever occurs first, for each reactor unit. 
In the event, the scope of work is limited to erection and pre-
commissioning of the facilities and commissioning will be done by the 
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It may be observed that the above clauses and approach are 
in line with the standard clauses suggested by some infrastructure 
contract committees who prepare standard templates for ease of 
doing business, such as the South African Joint Building Contracts 
Committee (JBCC) of South Africa, where Clause 22.1 addresses 
latent defects and states that “the latent defects liability period for 
the Works shall commence at the start of the construction period 
Purchaser, then the Defect Liability Period shall be 18 months from the 
date of completion of facilities (satisfactory erection and pre-
commissioning) and handing over of the facilities for commissioning to 
the Purchaser or 12 months form the date of commissioning of the 
facilities, whichever occurs first, for each reactor unit. 
b)Spares/Tools/Tackles/Accessories 
The Defect Liability Period shall be 18 months from the date of receipt 
of items (last consignment) at site or 12 months from the date of 
acceptance, whichever occurs first. 
 
Extension of 
Defects Liability 
Period 
 
a) If the Facilities or any part thereof cannot be used by reason of such 
defect and/or making good of such defect, the Defect Liability Period of 
the Facilities or such part, as the case may be, shall be extended by a 
period equal to the period during which the Facilities or such part 
cannot be used by the Purchaser because of any of the aforesaid reasons.  
Upon correction of the defects in the Facilities or any part thereof by 
repair/replacement, such repair/replacement shall have the Defects 
Liability Period for a period of twelve (12) months from the time such 
repair/replacement of the Facilities or any part thereof has been 
completed. 
b) In addition, the Contractor shall also provide an extended warranty 
for any such component of the Facilities and during the period of time 
as may be specified in the SCC.  Such obligation shall be in addition to 
the Defect Liability Period. 
 
Latent Defects 
Liability 
 
At the end of Defects Liability Period, the Contractor’s liability ceases 
except for latent defects.  The Contractor’s liability for latent defects 
warranty for the plant and equipment including spares shall be limited 
to a period of five (5) years from the end of Defects Liability Period of 
the respective plant and equipment including spares. 
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and end 5 years from the certified date of final completion.”85  
Moreover, such differentiation of latent defects and patent defects 
with respective defect liability periods are standard clauses in 
numerous infrastructure construction contracts in India, and is, 
hence, a well-established practice. 
Based on the above standard definitions and references to 
“latent defects” which one finds back in contracts between operator-
supplier (Purchaser-Contractor) in the case of supply of 
equipment/spares to an operator in the nuclear sector, the following 
points may be noted: 
a. The focus is on remedying the defects when 
discovered within a specified period; and 
b. The situations covered do not envisage a 
nuclear incident.  In other words: the defects need to 
be remedied, within the pre-agreed time limits of the 
Defects Liability Period—but repair/replacement is 
assumed to be accepted to be the appropriate solution 
between the contracting parties.  This would (most 
often) not be the situation in the event of a nuclear 
incident which would have triggered the strict 
liability of the operator to compensate the victims.  
More specifically still: the right of recourse is not 
sought as a remedy from the supplier for the 
repair/replacement of equipment/spares; rather the 
operator at that stage is seeking compensation for the 
money paid to the victims. 
c. Hence, the reference to the contractual terms 
of patent and latent defects in Section 17(b)—now, a 
stand-alone clause independent of whether a right of 
recourse was inserted as a Clause in the contract 
between operator-supplier or not—is only relevant to 
the extent of understanding what a latent defect may 
 
 85 See JOINT BUILDING CONTRACTS COMMITTEE, https://www.jbcc.co.za 
[https://perma.cc/8WJ6-QWPA]. For a detailed comparison of the JBCC, FIDIC and NEC 
contracts, see Muhammed Somrey, Jason Gouveia & Courtney Jones, An Issue for 
Interpretation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, in CONSTRUCTION LAW (Aug. 2017), 
https://withoutprejudice.co.za/free/article/5720/view [https://perma.cc/K7WN-4KAX]. 
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mean, but is not intended to attach to it the 
contractual consequences (repair or replacement)/nor 
the time-limits specified in the Defect Liability 
Period, because in principle now Section 17(b) can 
be relied upon even beyond the time specified 
contractually in the Defect Liability Period. 
d. Moreover, precisely because Section 17(b) is 
a stand-alone clause, a Judge may appreciate the 
definition given to “latent defects” in the operator-
supplier contract to understand the intent of the 
parties but will ultimately be guided by the 
precedents in his jurisdiction pertaining to “latent 
defects,” which we will study in the section below 
(see Section VII). 
e. It may also be worth noting that the definition 
of “latent defects” given in the standard operator-
supplier contracts in India—as meaning “a defect, 
inherently lying within the material or arising out of 
design deficiency, which do no manifest themselves 
and/or not reasonably discoverable during the defect 
liability period”—is in line with the case law 
pertaining to latent defects. 
In summary, as is common practice in most infrastructure 
contracts, the above clauses clarify that: the Contractor shall design, 
procure/manufacture, install and complete the Facilities with due 
care and diligence in accordance with the Contract and with the 
Purchaser’s instructions, and shall remedy any defects in the 
Facilities occurring in the Defect Liability Period, and remedy latent 
defects within a further period of x number of years from the end of 
the Defect Liability Period.  Indeed, at the end of the Defects 
Liability Period, the Contractor’s liability ceases except for latent 
defects.  However, the Contractor’s liability for latent defects 
warranty for the plant and equipment including spares shall be a 
limited to the agreed number of x years from the end of Defects 
Liability Period of the respective plant and equipment including 
spares. 
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At times, infrastructure contracts don’t always distinguish so 
clearly whether the Defect Liability Period (also referred to as 
“defect notification period” or “defect correction period”) also 
covers latent defects and whether the Defects Liability Period would 
be longer for latent defects or not.86  As we have seen in the Table 
above, however, most standard Purchaser-Contractor contracts in 
India in the nuclear energy sector do contain clauses specifically 
addressing latent defects, the liability for latent defects and the 
defect liability period for latent defects. 
In the absence of the CLND Act, any claim pertaining to 
latent defects would be solely governed by what is contractually 
agreed between the parties, including the agreed (extended) time 
limit for latent defects within which a Purchaser can request the 
Contractor to replace/remedy the latent defect.  In other words, after 
the agreed x number of years for which the defect liability period 
for latent defects has been agreed between the parties, the liability 
of the Contractor/supplier would extinguish and the Purchaser 
would not be able to claim such replacement/remedy for latent 
defects. 
We may also add here that in the real estate sector in India, 
insurance companies now also start to issue “Latent Defects 
Insurance” (LDI) policies to cover the obligation to rectify any 
defects (structural defects) under the Real Estate (Regulation and 
Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), if claimed within five years from 
the date of handing over possession of the unit to allottee by the 
promoter or the builder.87  Such LDI policies taken out by property 
developers are on the rise globally as a recent insurance trend.88  
Interestingly, with regards to some of the LDI policy issued in India 
in the real estate sector, the insurance company appoints an 
 
 86 Somrey, Gouveia & Jones, supra note 85. 
 87 SBI GENERAL INSURANCE, Latent Defects Insurance, 
https://www.sbigeneral.in/SBIG/sites/default/files/Downloads/Forms_and_Brochures/Broc
hures/Prospectus_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC7P-Z5GW]. For more information about 
RERA (and Section 14(3) pertaining to the obligation to rectify defects), see MINISTRY OF 
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REAL ESTATE REGULATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT ACT (2016), http://mohua.gov.in/cms/real-estate-regulation-and-
development-act-2016.php [https://perma.cc/M5S4-P7JG]. 
 88 With regard to the real estate market in the UK, see Naresh Dade, Latent Defects 
Insurance is On the Rise, JLTSPECIALTY.COM (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://landlordsinsurance.jltspecialty.com/en-bh/industry/construction-
insurance/construction-insights/latent-defects-insurance-is-on-the-rise 
[https://perma.cc/J8GM-NMVR]. 
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“Independent Technical Inspection Service Company” to carry out 
monitoring activities throughout the course of construction on the 
quality of the building, which could range from sample design 
checks to witnessing some tests at site (e.g. ultrasonic testing for 
density of concrete, hardness tests, etc.), and the “Independent 
Technical Inspection Service Company” will thereafter provide 
detailed reports and feedback on the quality of the construction as 
an independent expert party.89  As will be discussed below, such 
practice of independent third party reviewed as part of the INIP 
mechanism could evolve in the nuclear energy sector in India as 
well. 
B. Distinct Limitation Periods Applicable Between Victim-
Operator Claims (CLND Act) And Operator-Supplier Claims (Tort 
Law) 
Let’s first recall that the CLND Act contains its own 
limitation period90 in Section 18, within which a victim91 needs to 
file its claim against the operator, which states that the: “right to 
claim compensation for nuclear damage shall extinguish, if such 
claim is not made within a period of: a) ten years, in the case of 
damage to property; b) twenty years, in the case of personal injury 
to any person, from the date of occurrence of the incident notified 
under sub-section (1) of Section 3.” 
Section 18 of the CLND Act also contains a proviso 
clarifying that where a nuclear damage is caused by a nuclear 
incident involving nuclear material which, prior to such nuclear 
incident, had been stolen, lost, jettisoned or abandoned, the said 
 
 89 SBI GENERAL INSURANCE, supra note 87, at 4. 
 90 The Limitation Act, 1963, in its Section 2(j), distinguishes “period of limitation” 
from “prescription period” as follows, “period of limitation means the period of the 
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and ‘prescribed 
period’ means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the 
Act,”http://www.legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1963-36.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HS2N-EEBE]. 
 91 As per Section 14 CLND Act, an application for compensation before the Claims 
Commissioner or the Commission, in respect of nuclear damage may be made by: 
(a)A person who has sustained injury; or 
(b)The owner of the property to which damage has been caused; or 
(c)The legal representative of the deceased; or 
(d)Any agent duly authorized by such person or owner of legal representatives. CLND 
Rules, supra note 1. 
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period of ten years shall be computed from the date of such incident, 
but in no case, shall exceed a period of twenty years from the date 
of such theft, loss, jettison or abandonment. 
Moreover, Section 15(2) and Section 31(2) of the CLND Act 
pertaining to the procedure to be followed before respectively the 
Nuclear Damage Claims Commissioner/Commission further states 
that every application for compensation (by the victim against the 
operator) before the Commission for nuclear damage shall “be made 
within a period of three years from the date of knowledge of nuclear 
damage by the person suffering such damage.” 
Without quoting in full, but for the mere purpose of clarity 
and illustration, Section 2(g) of the CLND Act defines “nuclear 
damage” as: (i) loss of life or personal injury (including immediate 
and long-term health impact) to a person; or (ii) loss of, or damage 
to, property; or (iii) any economic loss, arising from the loss or 
damage referred to in (i) or (ii); or (iv) costs of measures of 
reinstatement of impaired environment caused by a nuclear incident 
(unless such impairment is insignificant); or (v) loss of income 
derived from an economic interest in any use or enjoyment of the 
environment; or (vi) the costs of preventive measures and further 
loss or damage caused by such measures; or (vii) any other 
economic loss. 
To be clear: Section 18 of the CLND Act prescribes the 
limitation period in the relationship of victims versus the operator.  
Only after that will the limitation period need to be calculated 
within which the operator needs to file its right of recourse claim 
against the supplier.  As we know, Section 17(a) CLND Act covers 
the situation where the right of recourse is agreed between parties 
contractually (and in that case the time limit within which such right 
of recourse can be relied upon will also be determined contractually 
—see our discussion above in Section VI—A) whereas Section 
17(b) must be treated as a stand-alone clause independently of 
whether a right of recourse provision was inserted in the operator-
supplier contract or not. 
As we have discussed (and will further illustrate in the case 
law discussion below), in the absence of a contract determining the 
contours of the right of recourse between the operator and the 
supplier, common tort law will apply.  Therefore, the limitation 
period applicable to torts will determine the limitation period within 
which the operator can rely on its right of recourse against the 
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supplier, after the operator paid the victim(s) as per the Award of 
the Nuclear Claims Commissioner/commission (and the limitation 
period governing the victims-operator relationship).  As per Part VII 
of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, 92 pertaining to suits 
relating to tort, the limitation period would be one year for 
compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in 
pursuance of any enactment in force, from the date when the act or 
omission takes place.  However, in the context of the right of 
recourse claim by the operator against the supplier where he can 
only activate as per the general heading of Section 17 CLND Act 
“after paying the compensation for nuclear damage in accordance 
with Section 6,” this one year limitation period as per the general 
Limitation Act will necessarily have to be calculated from the date 
that the operator paid the compensation for nuclear damage, as his 
right to claim back (part of) the amount from the supplier by way of 
right of recourse, will only start once he has met his own obligation 
to first pay the victims as per the Award—only then can he start 
exercising his right of recourse against the supplier, not before.93 
Section 16(1) and Section 32(6) of the CLND Act specify 
that respectively the Claims Commissioner/Claims Commission 
after duly giving an opportunity of being heard to the parties, 
dispose of the application within a period of three (3) months from 
the date of such receipt of application and make an Award 
accordingly. 
Let’s take a purely hypothetical example: 
a) A nuclear incident occurred on 1st June 2015. 
b) As per Section 3(1) CLND Act, the AERB 
notified the nuclear incident on 14 June 2015. 
c) The right to claim compensation for damage 
shall extinguish, if it is not made before: 
 
 92 Limitation Act 1963 and Schedule (explaining the content of Part VII). 
 93 Limitation Act 1963, Schedule 72 (Eng.).  Schedule 55 relates to compensation for 
breach of any contract, and the limitation period would be three years, Limitation Act 
1963, Schedule 55 (Eng.).  For a discussion on UK Limitation Act applicable to latent and 
patent defects in common law (which is distinct from the present situation), see 
Christopher Wong, Liability After Take-Over: the English Position, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 5 
2009), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8646cd6c-13e9-4818-b70d-
833689607a16 [https://perma.cc/5ZLB-VG2B]. 
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(i) 14th June 2025, in the case of damage to 
property; 
(ii) 14th June 2035, in the case of personal injury 
to any person. 
d) A victim files a claim for compensation for 
nuclear damage to its property on 15 February 2017, 
before the expiry of the 10 year limitation period and 
well within the three year knowledge period. 
e) The Claims Commissioner issues its Award 
on 2nd April 2017, within the three month deadline 
within which the CLND Act mandates him to render 
its Award. 
f) The operator pays the victim within one 
month from the date of the Award (to avoid paying 
interest for delayed payment), for example, on 2nd 
May 2017. 
g) After paying the victim on 2nd May 2017, the 
operator’s limitation period of one year to rely on its 
right of recourse against the supplier will expire on 
2nd May 2018. 
As pointed out by Saul and Hall Perloff, from a general 
policy and business perspective, parties need to know at which point 
their responsibilities end because without such “transactional 
endpoint” persons (and their insurance companies) would be 
reluctant to enter into binding agreements for fear that they might 
never extricate themselves from potential liability.94  However, with 
regards to the right of recourse in Section 17(b) CLNDA Act, the 
time limits contractually specified for the Defect Liability Period, 
will not impose a time limit on the Section 17(b) claim; in that case 
only the standard limitation period to file claim for damages under 
tort law, as per the Limitation Act, 1963, will apply. 
 
 94 Saul Perloff & Hal Perloff, Latent Defects in Government Contracts Law, 27 PUB. 
CONT. L. 87, 89 (1997). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss2/3
320 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
 
We must pinpoint that the general understanding in the legal 
community so far has been: either the latent defect liability period is 
addressed in the contract and that contractual arrangement shall 
govern the legal relationship between the parties, or if the parties 
were silent on the liability for latent defects, the common law rules 
will apply.  The CLND Act has now created a situation by 
disconnecting Section 17(b) from the contractual right of recourse 
situation (Section 17(a)) and treating it as a stand-alone clause, that 
even if the parties explicitly address and agree on how latent defects 
need to be addressed, and the defects liability period for latent 
defects expires, Section 17(b) will still give a separate ground to the 
operator to claim money back from the supplier for the money it 
paid to the victim as per the Award of the Claims Commissioner. 
The difference, quite subtly but importantly being, that 
whereas the contractual defect liability period focuses on the 
liability to replace/remedy the latent defect, in the case of a right of 
recourse by the operator against the supplier after having paid the 
victims as per the Award, it no longer holds the supplier liable to 
replace/remedy the latent defect, but rather to pay back the operator 
for the (full / portion) of the amount it paid to the victims to the 
extent of its contribution to the nuclear incident.  The operator will 
need to prove the liability for latent defects of the supplier as per 
general rules of tort law, as will be discussed below. 
Some authors, such as Somrey, Gouveia and Jones, are of 
the view that – even independent of the context of the CLND Act—
the defect notification period only creates the obligation to put the 
defect right, but does not address liability for the defect in general, 
beyond the obligation to actually remedy the defect.  Therefore, “the 
common law remedy to claim damages is not extinguished since all 
that the defect notification period does is limit the timeframe in 
which the employer has the right to notify and compel the contractor 
to return to site and make good the defects at the contractor’s own 
expense.”95  This would also entail that after the expiry of the defect 
notification period (whether patent or latent), the 
purchaser/employer/operator no longer has the legal right to compel 
the contractor/supplier to make good the defects that were notified 
within the specified period, but that instead the 
purchaser/employer/operator would have the right to file a claim for 
 
 95 Somrey, Gouveia & Jones, supra note 85. 
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damages against the contractor/supplier based on common law.96  
As a result, once we move away from the pure contractual claims 
and the meaning given therein to latent defects and patent defects 
and their respective defective liability periods, and enter the tort law 
realm of claims for damages based on negligence, the issue revolves 
around establishing the three constituent elements of a tort (as 
discussed above), to know: (1) a legal duty to exercise due care (by 
the defendant); (2) a breach of the said duty (by the defendant); and 
(3) consequential damage (suffered by the plaintiff).  In other 
words: once the claim does not relate to the breach of contract per 
se, but is based on a right of recourse embedded in tort law, the 
distinction between latent defects and patent defects will fade,97 and 
the focus will be on proving the three constituent elements of a tort 
of negligence (whether pertaining to latent or patent defects). 
VII. CASE LAW RELATING TO LATENT DEFECTS 
It must be clarified from the outset that in India there is no 
case law pertaining directly to the meaning of “latent defects” in the 
nuclear energy sector.  That said, there is abundant case law 
addressing the meaning of “latent defects” in a variety of other 
contexts.  Wherever possible, references will be made to case law in 
the infrastructure sector or pertaining to mechanical defects, to a 
large extent because the background in many infrastructure 
contracts and relationships between a Purchaser of services/material 
and a Supplier in the infrastructure field will be closely related to 
the nuclear energy sector. 
In Minu B. Mehta v. B.R. Nayan the Supreme Court rejected 
the appeal by an insurance company which argued that the accident 
was caused by a latent defect, in this case a mechanical failure, 
instead of the rash driving of the lorry driver based on lack of 
evidence. 98  It further states that the “owner is not liable if the 
accident is due to a latent defect which is not discoverable by 
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reasonable care” and further referred to Henderson v. Henry E. 
Jenkins & Sons which posited the law on the subject. 99  In that case, 
the lorry driver applied the brakes of the lorry on a steep hill but 
which failed to operate, as result of which the lorry struck and killed 
a man who was emerging from a parked vehicle.  The defence was 
that the brake failure was due to a “latent defect not discoverable by 
reasonable care” on the driver’s part.  Evidence was adduced and it 
was found that the brake failure was due to a steel pipe bursting 
caused by corrosion.  The corrosion had occurred where it could not 
be seen except by removing the pipe completely from the vehicle 
(which had never been done).  Expert evidence further showed that 
it was not a normal precaution to do this if, as was the case, the 
visible parts of the pipe were not corroded.  The corrosion was 
unusual and unexplained.  An expert witness said it must have been 
due to a chemical reaction of some kind such as exposure to salt 
from the roads in winter or on journeys near the sea.  The House of 
Lords held that the burden of proof which lay on the defendants to 
show that they had taken all reasonable care had been discharged in 
this case.  The defect remained undiscoverable despite due care.  As 
the evidence had shown that something unusual had happened to 
cause this corrosion it was necessary for the defendants to show that 
they neither knew nor ought to have known of any such unusual 
occurrence to cause the breakdown.100 
The above discussion in the Minu B. Mehta case clearly 
shows that expert evidence pertaining to a particular sector will be 
taken into account by the courts to understand whether a defendant 
has met his standard of reasonable care or not.  Similarly, in the 
nuclear energy sector, if an operator were to file suit based on its 
right of recourse, e.g. claiming that the supplier supplied equipment 
which contained a latent defect, the supplier will try to prove that it 
took all measures required from a supplier of his qualifications in 
the ordinary course of his business in the nuclear sector.  
Conversely, a supplier may also try to put up a contributory 
negligence defence and try to establish that it was the Purchaser 
who (partly) failed in his own duty of reasonable care as an 
operator.  Indeed, in most construction disputes relating to latent 
defects, the defendant/supplier would try to establish that the defect 
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is not a latent defect and that the knowledge of the defect can be 
inferred given that the plaintiff/operator should have discovered it 
by, e.g. due diligence of conducting reasonable inspection.  Again, 
this will be a fact-based analysis, with analysis based on which type 
of inspections a reasonable operator would have undertaken given 
his expertise and given standard practice in the nuclear energy 
sector.  Quite obviously, with regard to nuclear power plants, the 
question of whether a defect constituted a latent defect will not be 
based on a layman’s understanding and his means of assessing 
whether there was a latent defect, but the benchmark will be that of 
a person possessing superior knowledge and expertise considered 
reasonable for the nuclear energy sector.  In other words: 
reasonableness and, for instance, what constitutes a reasonable 
inspection will be sector-specific and based on a factual 
determination, supported by the view and evidence of experts in the 
field which both parties (plaintiff/defendant) will submit.101 
Courts will also take the nature of the sector into account, in 
terms of whether these are inherently dangerous activities and what 
the fallout could be in the event of an accident.  This will influence 
the benchmark of reasonableness.  For instance, in one of the oldest 
aviation accident cases in the US, Maynard v. Stinson, the court 
held the plane manufacturer answerable for taking precautions 
which would have been commensurate with the damages which 
would likely result in the absence of such precautions because “the 
magnitude of possible harm in plane accidents is so serious, it does 
not seem unreasonable to hold the manufacturer responsible for 
taking almost all possible known safeguards” and further stated: 
“Ordinary care in cases where the result of a slip will be slight and 
unimportant is not sufficient care to fill the requirements of ordinary 
care where the result of a failure to exercise it will be dangerous or 
destructive to human life.”102 
With regard to contributory negligence of the plaintiff, the 
Supreme Court explained the legal position clearly in Pramodkumar 
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Rasikbhai Jhaveri v Karmasey Tak (in the context of a car accident) 
that the question of contributory negligence arises when there has 
been some act or omission on the claimant’s part, which has 
materially contributed to the damage caused, and is of such a nature 
that it may properly be described as “negligence.”  Negligence 
ordinarily means breach of a legal duty to care, but when used in the 
expression “contributory negligence” it does not mean breach of any 
duty.  It only means the failure by a person to use reasonable care 
for the safety of either himself or his property, so that he becomes 
blameworthy in part as an “author of his own wrong.”  Subject to 
non-requirement of the existence of duty, the question of 
contributory negligence is to be decided on the same principle on 
which the question of defendant’s negligence is decided.  The 
standard of reasonable man is as relevant in the case of plaintiff’s 
contributory negligence as in the case of defendant’s negligence.  
But the degree of want of care which will constitute contributory 
negligence, varies with the circumstances and the factual situation 
of the case.  The following observation of the High Court of 
Australia in Astley vs. Austrust Ltd. is worthy of quoting: “a finding 
of contributory negligence turns on a factual investigation whether 
the plaintiff contributed to his or her own loss by failing to take 
reasonable care of his or her person or property.”  What is 
reasonable care depends on the circumstances of the case.  In many 
cases, it may be proper for a plaintiff to rely on the defendant to 
perform its duty.  But there is no absolute rule.  The duties and 
responsibilities of the defendant are a variable factor in determining 
whether contributory negligence exists and, if so, to what degree.  In 
some cases, the nature of the duty owed may exculpate the plaintiff 
from a claim of contributory negligence; in other cases, the nature 
of the duty may reduce the plaintiff’s share of responsibility for the 
damage suffered; and in yet other cases the nature of the duty may 
not prevent a finding that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable care 
for the safety of his or her person or property.  Contributory 
negligence focuses on the conduct of the plaintiff.  The duty owed 
by the defendant, although relevant, is one only of many factors that 
must be weighed in determining whether the plaintiff has so 
conducted itself that it failed to take reasonable care for the safety of 
its person or property.103 
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Furthermore, it is relevant to keep in mind that many 
construction contracts have very detailed specifications regarding 
quality tests and inspection procedures to establish whether e.g. the 
delivered equipment meets the expected quality standards.  If these 
contractually agreed inspections are duly followed, it will act as 
affirmative proof that the inspection was performed with reasonable 
care by the Purchaser/operator and that he could not have 
discovered the latent defect.104  Similarly, Purchaser-Contractor 
contracts in the nuclear energy field in India, will contain clauses on 
Quality Assurance, Inspection, Acceptance and Rejection, and in the 
event of a claim by the operator against the supplier, the operator 
will wants to establish that these contractual clauses were duly 
followed.  For instance, in order to provide assurance to the 
Purchaser, the Contractor shall prepare a QA Manual based on the 
Purchaser’s Quality Assurance (QA) Program, which the Purchaser 
will review and needs to accept.  The Quality Management System 
of the Contractor will include aspects, such as: (i) the procedure for 
purchase of materials, parts, components, including source 
inspection, incoming raw material inspection, verification of 
materials purchased, etc.; (ii) traceability of material used in the 
production; (iii) control of non-conforming items and system for 
corrective and preventive actions, including disposal of non-
conforming items; (iv) inspection and test procedures for 
manufacturing activities; (v) control of calibration and testing of 
inspection, measuring and testing equipment; (vi) system of 
indication and appraisal of inspection status; (vii) system of quality 
audits; (viii) system for maintenance of records; etc.  The 
Purchaser/operator will have the right to carry out random quality 
checks.  Moreover, the Purchaser/operator will appoint a Quality 
Surveillance Engineer/Inspector who will inspect or carry out 
quality surveillance on suppliers, stores or work under the Contract.  
Also, the Project Manager appointed by the Purchaser, his duly 
authorised representative, or even an appointed outside inspection 
agency acting on behalf of the Purchaser, shall have at all 
reasonable times access to the Contractor’s premises or facilities 
and shall have the power at all reasonable times to inspect and 
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examine the materials and workmanship during the manufacture 
stage. 
Keep in mind that the discovery of a defect during any of 
such inspections would qualify the defect not as a latent defect, but 
as a patent defect.  However, the obligation is the same: the defect 
needs to be remedied, albeit that a different defect liability period 
would apply, i.e. latent defects attract a longer contractual defect 
liability period precisely because it is generally accepted that latent 
defects are more difficult to detect than patent defects.  Here too, the 
Purchaser would then have the contractual right to insist that the 
Contractor replace / remedy the defect.  We must also be mindful of 
the fact that it is well-established in case law of common law 
countries (both in terms of general tort law as well as specifically 
pertaining to construction contracts) that a patent defect is one that 
is “discoverable” even though it may not have been discovered by a 
party.  Indeed, in one of the often referred to early cases on the 
subject, Sanderson v. National Coal Board,105 the Queen’s Bench 
Division explained that a patent defect is not latent merely because 
there is none to observe it or because it was not observed.  The true 
question is: was the defect observable by a reasonable person?  If 
the answer is affirmative, it will be treated as a patent defect.  
Indeed, the Court in this case held that: “the natural meaning of the 
word ‘patent’ is objective, not subjective.  It means ‘observable’ not 
‘observed’.  A patent defect must be apparent on inspection, but it is 
not dependent on the eye of the observer; it can blush unseen.”106  
To explain more about the background of the ruling: the case 
revolved a claim by a miner who had been injured by hooks sticking 
out from a conveyor belt which badly injured his leg.  The person 
who was in charge of overseeing the conveyor belt submitted that it 
was dark in the underground area and he could not observe the 
hooks, the employer taking forward this argument as the defect 
being latent and not patent.  However, the Court clarified that it is 
not a matter of whether the person in charge actually observed the 
hooks (defect) sticking out of the conveyor belt, but whether at that 
point in time the defect had become observable, in an objective 
manner and could have been observed had they simply used more 
light in that area.  In other words: it is not a defence to merely state 
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that a person/ inspector did not observe the defect; but whether the 
defect could have been observed by a reasonable person/inspector 
placed in the same circumstances, is the real point.  Again, a critical 
aspect which will be heavily based on the facts of each case and 
evidence adduced by the parties. 
Courts have reiterated the above reasoning of the Sanderson 
case, and, for instance, held with regard to construction projects that 
a defect will be patent if it is reasonably discoverable with the help 
of skilled third party advice (or by analogy: skilled experts 
directly).107 
We must further add that in the case of a right of recourse 
claim based on tort, a Judge will most certainly take into account 
whether and how the parties followed the Quality Assurance and 
Inspection steps and procedures as determined in the contract 
between the parties, but will not be limited by it in the analysis of 
the alleged tort.  This is distinct from, for instance, the US case law 
pertaining to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which 
provides the US Government with a number of post-acceptance 
contractual rights, including the revocation of acceptance of latently 
defective work even after the defect liability period.  In those 
instances, the Government must establish that the latent defect 
caused the failure of the work to meet contractual requirements.108 
No such limitations would be applicable when addressing the right 
of recourse claims by the operator against the supplier based on 
Section 17(b) CLND Act; and US case pertaining to FAR must be 
distinguished on that point (although it may remain relevant to 
assess how latent defects were investigated and which type of 
evidence was adduced).  In the context of FAR-related case law, 
contactors will often argue that a defect is not latent because it could 
have been discovered had the Government conducted certain tests or 
inspections.  However, this argument will only prevail if conducting 
such tests or inspections was reasonable under the circumstances.  
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Here again, what will be considered as “reasonable” will heavily 
depend on the facts of each particular case.109 
Similarly, in the context of civil liability pertaining to 
aviation accidents in the US, courts have held 
manufacturers/designers accountable only for the “knowledge and 
skill possessed by an airplane designer in the year in which the 
plane in dispute was designed.  This has the effect of protecting the 
manufacturer from the admission of hindsight evidence” when 
assessing “ordinary care.”110  The same would be true for the 
nuclear energy sector, where courts will take into account the 
various design years of nuclear power plants and the components 
supplied to it and the knowledge which a supplier would have (or 
ought to have) had at the time of supplying components, or 
designing a power plant, as well as the standard safety standards, 
procedures and manuals applicable at that time pertaining to the 
manufacture, assembly or installation, which a reasonable supplier 
active in the nuclear sector would have had to follow as a minimum. 
In Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. M. K. Nakum, the breach 
of duty by a public authority was addressed.111  In this case a man 
died when a tree in a public street fell on him under normal weather 
conditions.  Ultimately, the public authority was held not to be 
liable.  The Supreme Court reiterated that negligence is failure to 
use such care that a reasonable, prudent and careful person would 
use, under similar circumstances.  In this case, the Court had to 
analyse whether the defendant (municipal corporation) breached its 
duty of care not to create a latent source of physical danger/damage 
to a third party whom he ought to have reasonable foreseen as likely 
to be affected thereby.112  The Court reviewed a long list of cases 
pertaining to such falling of tree incidents (whether standing on 
private or public property), including one case where a tree that had 
fallen from the property of a landlord was proved to have been due 
to a disease of the roots, but with no other external indication 
aboveground that it was affected by the disease.  After a detailed 
examination of the evidence, the Court held that since there was no 
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apparent evidence that the tree was affected with a disease, the 
person (landlord) in question was held to have acted reasonably as 
any other landlord would have done, as the landlord was not a 
scientific expert in this field.  Similarly, in the case at hand it was 
held that the municipal corporation had no knowledge and could not 
have had knowledge that a healthylooking tree would cause an 
accident in perfectly normal weather conditions and thereby it did 
not omit to fulfil its duty of care to prevent this accident.  If, 
however, the defendant had become aware of the decayed condition 
of the tree or had the knowledge that the tree was affected by a 
disease, but had taken no action to prevent the accident, in that case 
it would have been actionable.113 
There is abundant case law in India pertaining to the 
meaning of latent and patent defects in the context of the sale of 
goods. And the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 has the notion that there is 
an implied warranty in the goods delivered that they should be free 
of latent defects.114  For instance, in the case of Sorabji Hormusha 
Joshi & Co. v. V.M. Ismail,115 the Madras High Court referred to 
Section 16 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 on “implied conditions as 
to quality or fitness” of goods, to define patent and latent defects.  In 
short, Section 16 states that subject to the provisions of the Sale of 
Goods Act (and any other law being in force), there is no implied 
warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular 
purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale, except as 
follows: 
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes 
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are 
required, so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or 
judgment, and the goods are of a description which it is in the 
course of the seller’s business to supply (whether he is the 
manufacturer or producer or not), there is an implied condition that 
the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose . . . ; 
(2) Where goods are bought by description from a seller who 
deals in goods of that description (whether he is the manufacturer or 
producer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall 
 
 113 Id. at 58–59. 
 114 Sale of Goods Act, 1930, INDIA CODE, 
https://indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2390?view_type=browse&sam_handle=123456
789/1362 [https://perma.cc/H7J6-BWA9]. 
 115 Sorabji Hormusha Joshi & Co. v. V.M. Ismail, AIR 1960 Mad. 520 (India). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss2/3
330 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
 
be of merchantable quality: provided that, if the buyer has examined 
the goods, there shall be no implied condition as regards defects 
which such examination ought to have revealed. 
The Madras High Court, reflecting on similar principles in 
most common law countries, ruled that, Section 16 of the Act, 
“divides all such defects into two kinds, often called patent and 
latent defects.  Patent defects are, those which can be found on 
examination by a person of ordinary prudence with the exercise of 
due care and attention.  Latent defects are those which cannot be 
discovered on such examination.”  Hence, there is an implied 
condition on the seller’s part that the goods are free from latent 
defects; the condition exists even with regard to patent defects as 
well, if there has been no examination of the goods by the buyer.116  
These cases help in defining “latent defects” in the specific context 
of sale of goods; and as a result many contracts will refer to this 
standard definition of latent defects as well.  This stream of case law 
is also relevant for those contracts which did not explicitly address 
the issue of latent defects, whereby the law will apply such an 
implied clause of goods being free of latent defects.117 
Similarly, US case law also confirms that a rather standard 
understanding of “latent defects” is relied upon by courts, and will 
often be interpreted to mean: “latent defects are generally 
considered to be hidden or concealed defects which are not 
discoverable by reasonable and customary inspection . . . .”118  For 
instance, in Tricon-Triangle Contractors, a water line which had 
been installed by a contractor started leaking after one year, where a 
subsequent inspection revealed the nuts were not properly tightened 
on the bolds holding the pipe flanges together.  Here it was held that 
the Government could not revoke its acceptance because this 
situation did not qualify as a latent defect.  Indeed, it was held that a 
“latent defect cannot exist if by reasonable means it would have 
been detected prior to acceptance.”119  But there are exceptions to 
the rule in US case law (pertaining to the Federal Acquisition 
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Regulation or FAR as discussed above) according to which 
observable defects are necessarily patent.  For instance, in Kaminer 
Construction Corp. v. United States,120 the Court of Claims held 
with regard to the construction of a crane that although not hidden 
from sight, it was nevertheless a latent defect because only 8 out of 
12,000-odd bolts were undersized and the size discrepancy was not 
great, therefore the Government could not reasonably have been 
expected to discover the mistake.121  One must add that the 
threshold of reasonableness for both the operator and supplier in the 
nuclear energy sector would be higher compared to mainstream 
construction projects.  Indeed, (although still in the context of the 
FAR case law in the US), courts will not hesitate to assess whether a 
more demanding inspection than the one specified in the contract 
would have been reasonable under the circumstances and would 
have revealed the presence of the latent defect.  As mentioned 
above, in the context of a Section 17(b) CLND Act right of recourse 
claim for compensation, Indian courts are bound to also take into 
account the contractual Quality Assurance, Inspection, Acceptance 
and Rejection clauses, but will go further and beyond the 
contractual clauses and assess what was reasonable in the specific 
circumstances of that case in the nuclear energy sector. 
Another difficulty with regard to any latent defect in the 
goods/services supplied by a supplier which is alleged to have 
contributed to the nuclear incident, is in the case where there is 
more than one cause which contributed to the ultimate nuclear 
incident.  Just like with aviation accidents, nuclear accidents may 
often be the result of a multitude of technical and human failures, 
and recovery of damages will be limited to the portion of damages 
that the operator/plaintiff establishes with reasonable accuracy to be 
the result from these latent defects.122  Moreover, in such 
construction-related disputes, very often the contractor will try to 
defend the position according to which it is the improper use or a 
design flaw which is to blame for the failure, rather than any error 
on the part of the contractor.123  An analysis of aviation accidents 
and nuclear power plant accidents often expose a confluence of 
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multiple factors, possibly from both the operator as well as 
suppliers, human errors and technical failures.124 
We may also add here that within companies and industries 
which  focus heavily on safety culture and safety management there 
is a strong focus on precisely trying to detect latent errors to make 
their own effective safety management and workplace safety 
systems more robust.125  For instance, within the nuclear energy 
sector, experiences and lessons learned in terms of failures or best 
safety practices are being shared at various levels (e.g. between 
regulatory authorities, operators, nuclear energy agencies, etc.), 
including relating to latent design deficiencies which “can remain 
unidentified for a long time after the commissioning of the plant and 
cause significant problems only after many years of operation.”126 
The key take-away from the case law discussion above, is 
that there is no one-size fits all general standard of reasonable care, 
but that such tort cases are always based on the facts of each case, 
taking into account the expertise of the respective parties, and will 
revolve around understanding how a reasonable person in the same 
circumstances in the same sector with the same expertise would 
have acted, and to establish this benchmark specific to each case, 
courts will heavily rely on the evidence from experts in that 
particular field.  Indeed, this seems to be inherent to the “fact-
intensive nature of latent defects disputes.”127 
VIII. INDIA NUCLEAR INSURANCE POOL AND ITS JOINT 
RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
As mentioned, this Note’s intent is to focus on the notion of 
“latent defects” in the situation where the operator decides to 
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exercise its right of recourse under Section 17(b) CLND Act against 
the supplier.  Given the unique development under the Indian 
Nuclear Insurance Pool (INIP) which precisely tries to address the 
civil liability for nuclear damage claims, including between the 
operator and the supplier, we must add a word on this specific 
insurance mechanism as well.128 
In June, 2015, INIP, the 27th nuclear insurance pool, was 
formally launched, with the General Insurance Corporation of India 
(GIC Re), being the Pool Manager, with a total capacity to be 
achieved of Rs. 1,500 Crores (about USD 237,5 million), 
corresponding to the capped liability amount resting on the operator 
as specified in Section 6(2) of the CLND Act.  Most interestingly is 
that INIP was also mandated to cover the risks of the suppliers 
under Section 17(a) and Section 17(b) of the CLND Act via an 
insurance policy for suppliers to cover their right of recourse risk.  
Quite understandably, the right of recourse situation foreseen under 
Section 17(c) CLND Act pertaining to the intentional act of an 
individual is not covered.  Hence, INIP will issue two types of 
policies: a) Nuclear Operator’s Liability (CLND Act 2010) 
Insurance policy; and b) Nuclear Supplier’s Insurance Policy (Right 
to Recourse only under CLND Act, 2010). 
GIC Re along with 11 other non-life insurers have gathered 
about 2/3 of the required capacity so far,129 and the balance capacity 
will be contributed by the Government on a tapering basis.130  We 
must add here that the international insurance market has not 
committed any capacity or reinsurance support to INIP based on 
various concerns relating to this unique insurance construct 
(including relating to risk inspection, pricing, etc.). 
The first Operator’s Policy was issued to the Nuclear Power 
Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) on 26 May, 2016; and the 
Supplier’s Policy was unveiled shortly after in August, 2016.  
However, no such supplier policy has been issued to a supplier yet 
as on date. 
 
 128 KINI, INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRADE, supra note 2. 
 129 Consisting of both public sector undertakings and private companies, with the New 
India Assurance Co. Ltd. being the designated Policy Issuing member company. 
 130 Question 14 of the Frequently Asked Questions and Answers on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage Act 2010 and Related Issues (“FAQ”) (Feb. 8, 2015), 
http://www.mea.gov.in/press-
releases.htm?dtl/24766/Frequently_Asked_Questions_and_Answers_on_Civil_Liability_fo
r_Nuclear_Damage_Act_2010_and_related_issue [https://perma.cc/7EX9-CXQB]. 
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We may have to insert an intermezzo here, pertaining to the 
situations where NPCIL assumes the role of supplier, as defined 
under Rule 24(2)(b) of the CLND Rules,131 in contracts where 
NPCIL is the system designer and technology owner, being 
responsible for safety designs of such installations.  More 
specifically, this would be the case for the indigenously designed 
Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs).  In other words, in 
such contracts relating to PHWRs designed by NPCIL, NPCIL will 
contractually agree to be the supplier for the purpose referred to 
under the CLND Act and Rules.  As a result, in such situations it 
will not necessarily rely on its right of recourse against the supplier, 
given that NPCIL itself will be deemed to be the supplier.  Here, 
with NPCL being both the operator and the supplier, NPCIL will 
not be taking a separate supplier policy under the INIP regime and 
only an operator policy will be issued. 
This is the unique approach taken by NPCIL as on date, 
although it remains to be seen how long this contractual practice 
will prevail where NPCIL assumes the role of both operator and 
supplier for its indigenously designed PHWRs. 
The further discussion below builds on all the other 
situations, not pertaining to the PHWRs designed by NPCIL, and 
where NPCIL will not assume the role as supplier for the purpose of 
the right of recourse provision. 
Given that INIP would be issuing insurance policies to both 
the operator as well as the suppliers, it would be subrogated in both 
the rights of the operator as well as the supplier, if the operator 
decides to exercise its right of recourse.  It must be noted that as 
much as it is legally mandatory for the operator to take out an 
insurance policy or other financial security to cover its liability 
(Section 8 of the CLND Act), no such corresponding obligation 
rests on the supplier.  However, most suppliers may decide to opt 
for this “joint risk management” approach, with corresponding 
subrogation by the Pool Manager, rather than having a right of 
 
 131 Rule 24(2)(b) CLND Rules contains an explanation of the term “supplier” which 
“shall include a person who— 
(i)Manufactures and supplies, either directly or through an agent, a system, equipment or 
component or builds a structure on the basis of functional specification; or 
(ii)Provides build to print or detailed design specifications to a vendor for manufacturing a 
system, equipment or component or building a structure and is responsible to the operator 
for design and quality assurance; or 
(iii)Provides quality assurance or design services.” CLND Rules, supra note 1. 
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recourse litigation fought out in court, based on regular fault-based 
tort law principles, as discussed above. 
This proposed insurance-based approach is based on trying 
to make the operator and suppliers as “partners managing a risk 
together.”132  While staying within the four corners of the CLND 
Act, the approach is certainly not built on a pure insurance logic, 
given that it can be argued that the same risk would be insured 
twice.  This avoidance of multiple coverages of the same risk, is 
reminiscent of some of the discussions which took place in the 
1950s during the discussions reflected in the Harvard Report, and 
which precisely underpin some of the unique nuclear law principles, 
such as legal channelling (or economic channelling in the US) and 
restricting the right of recourse grounds by the operator against the 
supplier, in deviation of regular tort law.133 
We further understand that INIP and its policy holders may 
also want to devise an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, 
possibly akin to arbitration with (pre-agreed) expert arbitrators, to 
avoid lengthy litigation between the operator and the supplier, 
particularly because if the supplier opts to obtain an INIP Supplier 
Policy, INIP would be subrogated in the rights of both parties.  
Quite clearly it will be very important to identify independent 
experts whom both parties accept.  We must flag that for suppliers 
who would not have opted for an INIP Supplier Policy, their legal 
right to defend themselves before regular civil courts would remain 
unfettered. 
As we have mentioned above with reference to infrastructure 
contracts in the real estate sector in India, the issuance of Latent 
Defects Insurance (LDI) policies are on the rise.  In this context they 
cover the legal obligation of the developers to rectify latent defects 
up to five years from the date of handing over the possession of the 
unit, in line with the new RERA legislation.  As part of this LDI 
policy, the insurance companies also appoint an “Independent 
Technical Inspection Service Company” to carry out monitoring 
activities throughout the course of construction on the quality of the 
building, who will thereafter provide detailed reports and feedback 
on the quality of the construction as an independent expert party.  A 
similar ongoing independent third party technical review 
 
 132 Id. 
 133 HARVARD REPORT, supra note 24. 
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mechanism, (provided that the necessary independent technical 
expertise can be found), not necessarily binding in itself but as a 
reliable barometer of “reasonableness,” could be envisaged under 
the INIP mechanism as well.  And given the fact-intensive nature of 
any right of recourse claim from an operator against a supplier, the 
mechanism could benefit both parties, whether ultimately 
adjudicated before a regular civil court or an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
We have highlighted how nuclear law, with its unique 
characteristics based on the nuclear law principles which are 
reflected in both the international Vienna and Paris regimes as well 
as domestic legislations, such as the CLND Act, will be interpreted 
by Judges as the applicable lex specialis. 
Other inherently hazardous industries, or rather sectors 
where incidents qualify as high-impact, low-probability events, and 
with possible transboundary effects, such as the aviation and 
maritime sectors, also have unique legal rules that govern their 
sector.  Moreover, the notion of strict liability is not unique to the 
nuclear energy sector but can be found back in many jurisdictions 
with respect to civil liability of industries engaged in inherently 
hazardous activities.  However, the principle of legal channelling of 
the liability exclusively to the operator, remains a unique 
characteristic to the nuclear energy sector. 
The public policy debate on precisely how much this special 
nuclear law regime should be allowed to deviate from standard tort 
law principles can be traced back to discussions which preceded the 
adoption of the 1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Vienna 
Convention.  As we have seen, many of the same arguments and 
diverging views were reflected in the Parliamentary debates prior to 
the adoption of the CLND Act as well. 
As discussed, parties to the respective Paris and Vienna 
Conventions ultimately agreed that the civil liability ought, from a 
public policy perspective, be channelled to the operator exclusively 
and that the operator’s right of recourse against the supplier should 
be limited to two grounds: (1) when the parties agree so 
contractually; and (2) in the event of where an individual 
intentionally caused the damage. 
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As we have seen, business practice between contracting 
parties or in government agreements in the nuclear energy field has 
evolved such over the years that no such right of recourse is 
typically inserted in operator-supplier agreements. 
We have also touched upon the fact that the contractual 
liability of latent defects is typically included in all operator-
supplier contracts in India, in line with international infrastructure 
practice, but in such situations the aim is to ensure the supplier 
remedies the latent defects; whereas a right of recourse claim 
instituted by the operator would essentially seek to recover 
monetarily what it was mandated to pay to the victims by an Award 
of the Nuclear Commissioner/Nuclear Damage Claims Commission. 
The CLND Act adopted in 2010 triggered a fresh debate by 
inserting a stand-alone right of recourse clause, Section 17(b) of the 
CLND Act, where the nuclear incident has resulted as a 
consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, which includes 
supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-
standard services.  Clearly, Section 17(b) is even more open-ended 
and not just limited to situations of patent and latent defects in 
material, equipment or services provided to the operator.  
Nevertheless, this Note sought to particularly focus on case law 
pertaining to “latent defects” given its inherent difficulty and 
evidentiary challenges.  Such reliance on general case law 
pertaining to latent defects is appropriate given that the legal 
relationship between the operator and the supplier in a right of 
recourse claim based on Section 17(b) of the CLND Act would be 
governed by general tort law principles. 
It is well-established based in a long line of case laws in 
common law countries that latent defects are defects not 
discoverable by reasonable care.  However, an analysis of what 
constitutes “reasonable care” is very fact and context specific and 
will heavily rely on factual determinations, supported by the view 
and evidence of experts in the field.  Courts will also take the nature 
of the sector into account, in terms of whether these are inherently 
dangerous activities and what the fallout could be in the event of an 
accident.  This will influence and heighten the benchmark of 
reasonableness. 
Courts will also take into account the various design years of 
nuclear power plants and the components supplied to it and the 
knowledge which a supplier would have (or ought to have) had at 
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the time of supplying components, or designing a power plant, as 
well as the standard safety standards, procedures and manuals 
applicable at that time pertaining to the manufacture, assembly or 
installation, which a reasonable supplier active in the nuclear sector 
would have had to follow as a minimum at that particular time. 
The key take-away from the case law analysis is that there is 
no one-size fits all general standard of reasonable care, but that such 
tort cases are always based on the facts of each case, taking into 
account the expertise of the respective parties, and will revolve 
around understanding how a reasonable person in the same 
circumstances in the same sector with the same expertise would 
have acted.  To establish this benchmark specific to each case, 
courts will rely heavily on the evidence from experts in that 
particular field.  Indeed, this seems to be inherent to the “fact-
intensive nature of latent defects disputes.” 
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